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THE CONSTITUTIONAL CANON AS ARGUMENTATIVE
METONYMY
Ian Bartrum*
It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical
propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such
empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this
relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and
hard ones became fluid.
—Ludwig Wittgenstein1
In recent years, the constitutional canon has been a subject of growing interest
and controversy among theorists as notable and diverse as Bruce Ackerman, Jack
Balkin, Sanford Levinson, Philip Bobbitt, William Rich, Richard Primus, and
Suzanna Sherry.2  The thought, crudely put, is that there are certain texts apart from
the Constitution—some are directly derivative, others are not—which resound so
powerfully in our constitutional ear that they have hardened, in incompletely defined
ways, into part of the fundamental law itself.3  This idea, in all of its permutations, is
profoundly important for constitutional lawyers, particularly as our constitutional cul-
ture continues to quake, erupt, and reform along unforeseen and unforeseeable tech-
nological and communicative fault lines.  After all, it is largely through the ongoing
construction and reconstruction of the canon—the reconfiguration of Wittgenstein’s
“fluid” and “hardened” propositions—that we accomplish modern constitutional re-
form; or something akin to the five-staged “constitutional moments” that Ackerman
* Irving S. Ribicoff Fellow, Yale Law School. Many thanks to Bruce Ackerman, Akhil
Reed Amar, Diego Arguelhes, Jack Balkin, Or Bassok, Philip Bobbitt, Jules Coleman,
Christopher Essert, John Greabe, Philip Hamburger, Leslie Harris, Stephan Jaggi, Paul Kahn,
Mark Kende, Jed Kroncke, Anthony Kronman, Sanford Levinson, Robert Post, Aziz Rana,
Seth Barrett Tillman, and participants in the Yale Law School Multidisciplinary Forum for
conversations, comments, and ideas related to this project.
1 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY 15 (#96) (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von Wright
eds., Denis Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe trans., Harper & Row 1972) (1969).
2 See, e.g., Philip Bobbitt, The Constitutional Canon, in LEGAL CANONS 331 (J.M. Balkin
& Sanford Levinson eds., 2000); Suzanna Sherry, The Canon in Constitutional Law, in LEGAL
CANONS, supra, at 374; Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737,
1750–57 (2007); J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111
HARV. L. REV. 963 (1998); Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48
DUKE L.J. 243 (1998); William J. Rich, Taking “Privileges or Immunities” Seriously: A Call
to Expand the Constitutional Canon, 87 MINN. L. REV. 153, 199–232 (2002).
3 See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 2 (discussing the substance and source of legal
canons).
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has so insightfully identified.4  And, as our discourse evolves to incorporate terms
like “superprecedent”5 and “landmark statute,”6 it is critical that we continue to work
towards a coherent theory of the canon and its function in constitutional practice.
My admiration for Philip Bobbitt’s modal theory of the Constitution—which
posits six legitimate “modalities” of constitutional argument—is on record,7 and so
it is perhaps unsurprising that I am drawn to his attempt at a modal catalogue of canon-
ical texts.8  And although I conceive of this project as in keeping with Bobbitt’s orig-
inal Wittgensteinian insight,9 my approach to the relationship between the constitutional
canon and the constitutional modalities is different than that which he has taken.  While
Bobbitt identifies particular canonical texts as exemplars of the different modalities
of argument,10 my purpose here is to explore the ways that we use these texts to help
make modal arguments and decisions within the practice of constitutional law.  I thus
take Bobbitt’s opening insight—“[t]exts may speak, but they do not decide”11—as the
starting point of an account that sees many canonical texts employed as metonyms for
larger constitutional principles or concepts.  I borrow an idea from language theory,
as does Bobbitt’s modal account, because law, like language, is a practice, an inter-
active communicative enterprise that legitimizes particular acts or utterances based
on their usage and acceptance within a specific community and context.12  It is, in
other words, impossible to say what McCulloch v. Maryland,13 for example, “means”
in absolute terms; rather, to understand that text’s constitutional significance we
4 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 18–20 (1998).
5 See Jeffrey Rosen, So, Do You Believe in ‘Superprecedent’?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,
2005, §4, at 1.
6 See Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, Canonizing the Civil Rights Revolution: The
People and the Poll Tax, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 125–30 (2009) (discussing the “shift from
formal amendment to landmark statute” in the context of the civil rights struggle).
7 See, e.g., Ian C. Bartrum, Metaphors and Modalities: Meditations on Bobbitt’s Theory
of the Constitution, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 157 (2008). Bobbitt has theorized that it
is the form or modality of a constitutional argument that determines its legitimacy. He identifies
six legitimate argumentative modalities: historical, textual, doctrinal, structural, prudential,
and ethical. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991).
8 Bobbitt, supra note 2, at 332–56.
9 See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 5, 123
(1982). Bobbitt’s insight is Wittgensteinian in that he argues that constitutional meanings are
embedded (and only comprehensible) within the practice of constitutional argument. It is,
in other words, impossible to say what a constitutional provision means in the abstract; rather,
we can only usefully identify meanings in context as we apply the modalities of argument to
make concrete constitutional decisions.
10 See Bobbitt, supra note 2, at 332.
11 Id. at 331.
12 For a theoretical account of language in these terms, see generally LUDWIG
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1967)
(1953), positing a theory of reference based partly on correct usage within particular language-
games.
13 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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must look to how it is used in the constitutional conversation.  To this end, I hope
that the concept of constitutional metonyms can help illuminate the ways that we both
use and recreate the canon as we build constitutional arguments and make constitu-
tional decisions.
Accordingly, this paper does not attempt to justify a list of the most canonical
texts in constitutional law, nor do I argue that we should treat certain cases or statutes
as constitutional amendments accomplished outside of the Article V process.  Rather,
I explore the ways that we use canonical texts when we make the kinds of constitu-
tional arguments that Bobbitt has identified.  I have thus tried to choose texts that
most lawyers would agree are either canonical or “anti-canonical”14—I contend here
that the canon and the anti-canon serve the same metonymic function in our practice—
in the hope that a few specific illustrations might provide a sufficient model from which
to extrapolate the theory I propose.  That theory, succinctly put, is that a canonical text
serves as a placeholder—a metonym—for a larger set of associated ideas or principles;15
and further, that this larger set of ideas is not always entirely consistent with the orig-
inal meaning of the particular text.  Thus, a canonical text takes on its own metonymic
meanings—sometimes quite apart from its literal textual meaning—within the practice
of constitutional law.  Indeed, it is largely the power and utility that a text has as a
metonym for larger values within our modal practice that determines whether, and how,
we accept it as canonical.  Canonical texts, which we might see as having “hardened”
in the Wittgensteinian sense, make up the channels through which more “fluid” propo-
sitions of constitutional meaning then flow.  But precisely because these texts func-
tion as metonyms—not as narrow or literal statements of law—their propositional
content will change as the associated concepts they connote are realigned within con-
stitutional culture and practice.  It is thus ever a two-way street:  the canon channels
the practice, but, in turn, the practice reshapes the canon.  And, of real significance for
practitioners, a deeper understanding of these processes may provide more sophisti-
cated tools with which to exercise long-term influence on constitutional meanings.
With this in mind, I have organized the examples below along three separate axes. 
First, I locate each illustration within a particular constitutional modality; that is, I
identify the form of argument that canonized the particular text.  Thus, the Gettysburg
Address, which appears in the final section, makes up a part of the ethical canon:  it
is a product of Lincoln’s ethical argument about constitutional meaning, and it is now
among those texts a practitioner can use—or at least must account for—as she con-
structs constitutional arguments rooted in the ethos of American democracy.  I do not
14 Accord Primus, supra note 2, at 245 (defining the “anti-canon” as the set of texts that
are crucial to the study of constitutional law, yet normally disapproved); see Balkin & Levinson,
supra note 2, at 1018–19 (discussing the formation of an “anti-canon”).
15 Professors Balkin and Levinson make—though do not much explore—a similar point
in their discussion of the canon as “examples.” Balkin & Levinson, supra note 2, at 992.
They even go so far as to label some canonical arguments “synecdoches,” id., although I think
the broader trope (metonym) is more precisely applicable.
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mean to suggest that a canonical text can only appear in one modality of argument—
indeed I have argued elsewhere that some of the most important moments of consti-
tutional evolution result from the overlap of modal arguments16—but I do contend that
each piece of the canon has a modal home, so to speak, where it is most comfortably
employed.  Second, I have tried to choose examples that illustrate three distinct cate-
gories of evolution in metonymic meaning.  My first example demonstrates the process
of decanonization, in which a text is washed out of the constitutional riverbed and
carried away downstream; the second illustrates the process of canonical refinement,
in which a text’s metonymic meaning is distilled as it assimilates into a changing con-
stitutional culture; and the third exemplifies the process of canonical reformation,
in which a text assumes—or reassumes—vital and significant metonymic meanings.17 
Finally, I identify the predominant sphere of constitutional discourse within which
the relevant changes in metonymic meaning have taken place:  in my examples the
respective spheres are the Court, the legal academy, and constitutional politics.  By
organizing the examples in this way, I hope to offer practitioners a descriptive model
of canonical, and thus constitutional, change accomplished within the existing modal-
ities of argument, which may alert creative advocates to valuable new methods of
the craft.
Those looking for a normative kind of thesis in this piece will, I fear, be disap-
pointed, as this is a decidedly descriptive project.  Indeed, this approach is in keep-
ing with the central and illuminating Wittgensteinian insight that Bobbitt has brought
to constitutional law.  That is, there are no “right” answers to many constitutional
questions; there are no foundational kinds of definitions for the most controverted
constitutional terms, which we might discover if only we could hit upon the correct
interpretive theory or algorithm.  All that we have is the constitutional conversation
itself—this discussion and its derivative decisions are, in fact, the Constitution—and
the only meanings we can attach to disputed terms are those that we can discover by
looking to their proper use.18  That is my purpose here, to describe evolutions in the
16 Bartrum, supra note 7, at 168.
17 It might be helpful here to think of the canon in terms of another, non-geological, analogy.
Imagine canonical texts as argumentative boundary stakes, which roughly describe the path a
competent practitioner must travel within a particular modality. Attached to these stakes are
a number of metonymic meanings, which further define the contours and scope of acceptable
argument. In decanonization the stake and all its meanings are simply uprooted and carried
away, perhaps to appear again somewhere else. In canonical refinement one or more metonymic
meanings are detached from the stake, which remains in place. And in canonical reform a
significant new (or renewed) meaning is attached to the original stake, which dramatically
alters the shape of the practice. It is certainly no accident that these processes roughly corres-
pond to the familiar doctrinal practices of repudiating, distinguishing, and extending common
law precedent.
18 See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 12, at 20 (#43) (“[T]he meaning of a word is its use in
the language.”). Indeed, Wittgenstein might have agreed that, like philosophical problems, our
deepest constitutional dilemmas arise when our constitutional grammar “goes on holiday”;
when we try to assimilate the use of one kind of term to a discussion of a different kind, or
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use—and thus the meaning—of canonical texts in constitutional argument, and to
thus identify ways that we can influence and adapt constitutional meanings over time
through particular uses of modal argument.  It is nonetheless true that such a descrip-
tive project is also, by necessity, a historical project, complete with its own kinds of
interpretive decisions and normative judgments.  But my aim here is at a particular
kind of history—an argumentative history, for lack of a better phrase—which explores
the appearance and construction of canonical texts within particular arguments and
tries generally to avoid taking a position on the merits of substantive claims.  Along
the way, I do also hope that I may tell old stories anew and reinvigorate familiar his-
torical narratives.  As for normative constitutional theories, a priori definitions, and
interpretive algorithms, however, I am content here to pass over them in silence.  With
that said, I hope the illustrations below can help to clarify the concept of canonical
metonyms and their importance to the practice of constitutional law.
I. HISTORY:  THE SUPREME COURT, THOMAS JEFFERSON’S WALL OF
SEPARATION, AND DECANONIZATION
The Supreme Court incorporated the Establishment Clause against the states in
the 1947 decision Everson v. Board of Education, which upheld a New Jersey pro-
gram that reimbursed parents for the costs of public transportation to both public and
parochial schools.19  At the rhetorical center of Justice Hugo Black’s majority opinion
was a phrase taken from Thomas Jefferson’s reply letter to a group of dissenting
Connecticut Baptists:  “In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment
of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between church and
state.’”20  From this moment of constitutional canonization, the symbolic wall would
feature prominently in many of the establishment decisions handed down over the
next half century, but surprisingly little attention has been paid to the actual history
or context of Jefferson’s letter.21  While this circumstance is perfectly consistent with
a metonymic understanding of the canon, it is important for my descriptive purposes
here to begin with some contextual account of the letter’s original or literal meaning.
The story of the Danbury letter begins at least as far back as the bitterly contested
presidential election of 1800, in which Jefferson defeated incumbent Federalist John
Adams.22  As part of a vigorous smear campaign, the Federalist press used Jefferson’s
when we try to understand a term in isolation from the contexts in which it is normally em-
ployed. See id. at 19 (#38).
19 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). Some of the material and ideas in this section first appeared in
Ian Bartrum, Of Historiography and Constitutional Principle: Jefferson’s Reply to the Danbury
Baptists, 51 J. OF CHURCH & STATE 102 (2009). They are used here with the permission of
the Oxford University Press.
20 Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
21 See Bartrum, supra note 19.
22 For a provocative account of the vagaries of the 1800 contest, see Charles O. Lerche,
Jr., Jefferson and the Election of 1800: A Case Study in the Political Smear, 5 WM. & MARY
Q. 467 (1948).
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decades-old remarks about religious freedom in Virginia—including his infamous
claim that the worship of “twenty Gods, or no God . . . . [N]either picks my pocket
nor breaks my leg”23—to brand him a deist, or worse, an atheist.24  In the Connecticut
Courant, the pseudonymous “Burleigh” gladly paraded the various horribles that
Jefferson’s views might entail:  “The doctrine is this—that if a man believes in the
rectitude of murder, atheism, rape, adultery, etc. it is of no importance, because it
neither breaks our legs, nor picks our pockets; and as long as our pockets and legs are
safe, government is satisfied.”25  Even after the campaign, Federalists continued to
lament the election of the “howling atheist”26 whose supposed predilection was “to
eradicate every principle and efface every vestige of the christian religion.”27  And of
particular concern in New England was Jefferson’s refusal (as President) to make
official proclamations or prayers of thanksgiving on traditional days.28  Indeed, the
Massachusetts Columbian Centinel had earlier suggested that, in Virginia, a Governor
“in his public addresses may openly ridicule the Christian Religion, or deny the exis-
tence of God, without punishment or impeachment.”29
A year into his presidency, these “slander[s] and slanderers” still stung Jefferson,
who vehemently denied that he meant to encourage a “government without religion,”30
and he actively sought an opportunity to explain himself to his detractors in the North.31 
He got his chance when a committee of Baptist dissenters from Connecticut—who
saw Jefferson as a potential ally in their struggle against the Congregationalist state
23 THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 170 (J.W. Randolph ed., 1853).
24 See, e.g., A Letter to A Friend, CONN. COURANT, Aug. 18, 1800, at 2; accord Thomas
E. Buckley, Reflections on A Wall, 56 WM. & MARY Q. 795 (1999).
25 Burleigh, To the People of the United States, CONNECTICUT COURANT, July 7, 1800,
at 3.
26 See RICHARD J. PURCELL, CONNECTICUT IN TRANSITION: 1775–1818, at 313 (1918)
(quoting Connecticut clergyman Thomas Robbins’ diary entry, “I do not believe that the Most
High will permit a howling atheist to sit at the head of this nation”).
27 Lucius, Letter, WASHINGTON FEDERALIST, Feb. 10, 1801, at 2; accord Constance B.
Schulz, “Of Bigotry in Politics and Religion”: Jefferson’s Religion, the Federalist Press, and
the Syllabus, 91 VA. MAG. OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 73, 82 (1983).
28 PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 159 (2002).
29 Decius, The Jeffersoniad No. IV, COLUMBIAN CENTINEL, July 9, 1800, at 1 (emphasis
omitted).
30 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to De Witt Clinton (May 24, 1807), in 10 THE WORKS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 404–05 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905) (attributing the “lie” of “govern-
ment without religion” to “slanderer” William Linn, a villain he thought best left to the “scourge
of public opinion”). Jefferson also shared his lingering bitterness with friend Joseph Priestley:
“[W]hat an effort, my dear Sir, of bigotry in Politics & Religion have we gone through.” Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Joseph Priestley (Mar. 21, 1801), in 33 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 393 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2006). See also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Monroe (May 26, 1800), in 31 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 590 (reflecting
on the “calumny of atheism” he had suffered).
31 See HAMBURGER, supra note 28, at 159. Professor Hamburger presents a thorough and
thoughtful overview of the entire Danbury Baptists episode. Id. at 155–81.
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establishment—sent the new President a letter of congratulations.32  The Baptists’
letter, drafted in October of 1801, did not reach the White House until the last days
of December,33 but when it did finally arrive he undoubtedly welcomed the passage
on religious freedom:
Our Sentiments are uniformly on the side of Religious Liberty—
That religion is at all times and places a Matter between God and
Individuals—That no man ought to suffer in Name, person or
effects on account of his religious Opinions—That the legitimate
Power of civil Government extends no further than to punish the
man who works ill to his neighbor.  But Sir, our [Connecticut]
constitution of government is not specific.  Our antient charter,
together with the Laws made coincident therewith, were adopted
as the Basis of our government, At the time of our revolution; and
such had been our Laws & usages, & such still are; that Religion
is consider’d as the first object of Legislation; & therefore what
religious privileges we enjoy (as a minor part of the State) we
enjoy as favors granted, and not as inalienable rights:  and these . . .
are inconsistent with the rights of fre[e]men.  It is not to be won-
dered at therefore; if those, who seek after power & gain under
the pretense of government & Religion should reproach their
fellow men—should reproach their chief Magistrate, as an enemy
of religious Law & good order because he will not, dares not
assume the prerogative of Jehovah and make Laws to govern the
Kingdom of Christ.34
Jefferson quickly seized on the Baptists’ letter as an opportunity to clarify his
own position on official proclamations—though he recognized that this was not
directly responsive to the Baptists’ message35—and immediately crafted a reply to
the Danbury Association.  His original draft, in its entirety, reads as follows:
32 Jefferson told his Secretary of State, Levi Lincoln of Massachusetts, that the Baptists’
letter “furnishes an occasion . . . which I have long wished to find, of saying why I do not
proclaim fastings & thanksgivings, as my predecessors did.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to Levi Lincoln (Jan. 1, 1802), in THOMAS JEFFERSON PAPERS, available at http://memory
.loc.gov/ammem/collections/jefferson_papers/ (follow “Series” hyperlink; then follow “Series
1. General Correspondence. 1651–1827” hyperlink; then follow “November 15, 1801” hyper-
link; type 561 and then follow “Turn to Image”).
33 James H. Hutson, Thomas Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists: A Controversy
Rejoined, 56 WM. & MARY Q. 775, 782 (1999).
34 Letter from the Danbury Baptist Association to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 7, 1801), in
THOMAS JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 32 (follow “Series” hyperlink; then follow “Series
1. General Correspondence. 1651–1827” hyperlink; then follow “June 26, 1801” hyperlink;
type 957 and then follow “Turn to Image”) (underline in original).
35 See Letter from Jefferson to Lincoln, supra note 32 (conceding the “awkward” con-
nection between official proclamations and the Baptist’s letter).
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The affectionate sentiments of esteem & approbation which
you are so good as to express towards me on behalf of the Danbury
Baptist association, give me the highest satisfaction. [M]y duties
dictate a faithful & zealous pursuit of the interests of my constitu-
ents, and in proportion as they are persuaded of my fidelity to those
duties, the discharge of them becomes more & more pleasing.
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely
between man & his god, that he owes account to none other for his
faith or his worship, that the legitimate powers of government
reach actions only and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign
reverence that act of the whole American people which declared
that their legislature should make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, thus
building a wall of separation between church and state.  Congress
thus inhibited from acts respecting religion, and the Executive
authorized only to execute their acts, I have refrained from prescrib-
ing even those occasional performances of devotion practiced
indeed by the Executive of another nation as the legal head of its
church, but subject here, as religious exercises only to the volun-
tary regulations and discipline of each respective sect.  Adhering
to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of
the rights of conscience, . . . I shall see with sincere satisfaction
the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore to man all
his natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition
to his social duties.
I reciprocate your kind prayers for the protection and bless-
ing of the common father and creator of man, and tender you for
yourselves and the Danbury Baptist association assurances of my
highest respect & esteem.36
Here Jefferson was at pains to emphasize his particular limitations as executive of
the federal government—which must leave the subject of religion exclusively to the
state legislatures—and he even went so far as to link national proclamations of faith
with the hated English monarchy.37  But he also recognized that he was a Virginian,
36 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, and
Steven S. Nelson, a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association in the State of Connecticut
(Jan. 1, 1802), in THOMAS JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 32 (follow “Series” hyperlink; then
follow “Series 1. General Correspondence. 1651–1827” hyperlink; then follow “November 15,
1801” hyperlink; type 557 and then follow “Turn to Image”) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter
Jefferson to the Baptists]. For a reproduction of the letter with Jefferson’s handwritten deletions
revealed, see Hutson, supra note 33, at 778.
37 See Jefferson to the Baptists, supra note 36.
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and that his words could have unintended consequences in the devout Northeast, so he
decided to run the draft by his Secretary of State, Levi Lincoln of Massachusetts.38
Lincoln, who was familiar with New England religious and political life, sug-
gested that Jefferson soften his language and innuendo regarding official proclama-
tions, where, even among Republicans, “[t]his custom is venerable being handed down
from our ancestors.”39  While he agreed that Jefferson should try to communicate
his thoughts on disestablishment, he thought it “best to have it so guarded, as to be
incapable of having it construed into an implied censure of the usages of any of the
States.”40  The President took Lincoln’s advice and omitted the middle sentence of
the second paragraph, which specifically derided national proclamations as a vestige
of the English establishment.41  He noted in the margin of his handwritten draft that
this sentence “was omitted on the suggestion that it might give uneasiness to some
of our republican friends in the eastern states where the proclamation of thanksgivings
etc. by their Executives is an ancient habit and is respected.”42
The letter as sent, then, did not explicitly address the subject of federal procla-
mations—which initially had been among its primary motivations—and, as a result,
the final draft is open to an interpretation that is not readily apparent from the original
formulation.43  Where Jefferson’s first draft invoked the “wall of separation” between
the federal government and religion as justification for his refusal to perform public
devotions (a structural argument grounded in the distinct powers of state and federal
governments), it is possible to read the final letter as a kind of free-standing statement
on the potential parameters of a substantive federal disestablishment.  While it seems
unlikely that Jefferson intended to make such a statement—he understood the founding
view of the Establishment Clause as a federalism provision,44 and he had willingly
proclaimed days of thanksgiving when governor of Virginia45—his final language
38 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Levi Lincoln (Jan. 1, 1802), supra note 32.
39 Letter from Levi Lincoln to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 1, 1802), in THOMAS JEFFERSON
PAPERS, supra note 32 (follow “Series” hyperlink; then follow “Series 1. General Corre-
spondence. 1651–1827” hyperlink; then follow “November 15, 1801” hyperlink; type 562
and then follow “Turn to Image”).
40 Id.
41 Jefferson to the Baptists, supra note 36.
42 Id.
43 Perhaps as a result, the final letter did not get the publicity Jefferson had hoped for.
The Baptists chose neither to publish it nor to employ the new language of separation in their
subsequent efforts to undermine the Connecticut establishment. HAMBURGER, supra note 28,
at 163–65.
44 See LEONARD LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 74 (1986) (the clause provided “that religion as a subject of legislation was
reserved exclusively to the states”). That Jefferson accepted this conception is evidenced by
his deliberate mark of emphasis on “their legislature” in reference to the American people in the
handwritten draft of the letter. Jefferson to the Baptists, supra note 36.
45 Thomas Jefferson, Proclamation Appointing a Day of Thanksgiving and Prayer
(Nov. 11, 1779), reprinted in 3 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 30, at
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lent itself easily to this purpose after the Civil War when substantive questions about
federal disestablishment became more salient.  The natural place for such questions
to arise was in the federal territories, where the national government (through terri-
torial legislatures) exercised plenary power and in effect stood in the shoes of state
governments elsewhere.46  And thus it was in a case from the Utah territory that the
Supreme Court first turned its attention to Jefferson and began to construct the Danbury
letter’s metonymic meaning.
That case, decided in 1878, was Reynolds v. United States, in which a Mormon
challenged his federal polygamy conviction on Free Exercise grounds.47  The Court
struggled to find a precise constitutional definition of either “religion” or “religious
freedom”—which is hardly surprising given that the document left the subject entirely
to the states—and Chief Justice Morrison Waite thus decided to look beyond the text
“to the history of the times in the midst of which the [First Amendment] was adopted.”48 
In his effort to understand what substantive federal religious liberty might look like,
Waite turned to materials written during Virginia’s struggle to disestablish the Anglican
church:  Jefferson’s Virginia Statute Establishing Religious Freedom and James
Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.49  Then,
in hopes of bridging the gap between the state and federal spheres, Waite quoted the
entire central paragraph of the Danbury letter, whose pedigree made it, he thought, “an
authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the [First] [A]mendment.”50  In
so doing he began to lay the foundation for the letter’s metonymic meaning in consti-
tutional practice:  rather than focus on Jefferson’s literal intention to trace the bound-
aries of federal power, Waite immortalized an interpretation which treats the letter
177–79 (notably delivered two years after he drafted the substance of the “Virginia Statute
for Religious Freedom.” See THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE STATUTE OF VIRGINIA FOR RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM (1786), reprinted in THE VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM xvii–xviii
(Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughn eds., 1988)).
46 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 247–52
(1998). Indeed, Professor Amar points out that, through the Northwest Ordinance (enacted on
the same day that debates over an early version of the Establishment Clause took place), the
First Congress actively supported religion in the territories, which strongly suggests that the
early Establishment Clause had only structural, and not substantive, import. Id. at 247. Over
time, however, as territorial legislatures struggled to implement the First Amendment on the
ground, “[t]he agnostic federalism reading—hard enough for some to see when the establish-
ment clause addressed ‘Congress’—faded from view [and was] replaced by a substantive
anti-establishment interpretation.” Id. at 249.
47 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161–62 (1878).
48 Id. at 162.
49 Id. at 163; see also Jefferson, supra note 45; JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND
REMONSTRANCE (1785), reprinted in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE
POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 6–13 (1981) (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed., University
Press of New England 1981).
50 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
2009] THE CONSTITUTIONAL CANON 337
as a definitive statement on the substance of religious freedom.51  Given that Reynolds
was a Free Exercise case, however, it was not the “wall of separation” but Jefferson’s
distinction between “actions” and “opinions” that interested Waite, who concluded
that the Constitution did not preclude statutory prohibition of “acts” of polygamy.52
Substantive federal disestablishment continued to evolve in the territorial context,
however, and the Danbury letter made its first appearance in an Establishment Clause
decision when the Court of Appeals upheld the federal incorporation of a Catholic
hospital in the District of Columbia.53  The appeals court again reproduced the letter’s
central paragraph and quoted Chief Justice Waite’s opinion of its import,54 but went
on to offer an opinion on the nature and scope of the disestablishment reflected in
Jefferson’s wall metaphor:  “[T]he declaration was intended to secure . . . complete
religious liberty to all persons, and the absolute separation of the Church from the
State, by the prohibition of any preference, by law, in favor of any one religious per-
suasion or mode of worship.”55  This interpretation—which has sometimes been
labeled a “nonpreferentialist” or “accommodationist” reading56—corresponds to what
I have called an “inclusive” theory of state neutrality, which views the state as reli-
giously neutral when it includes all religious viewpoints equally.57  Roberts v. Bradfield
made its way up to the Supreme Court, which upheld the disposition below but chose
not to invoke the Danbury letter in support of its opinion.58  The Court’s decision not
to adopt the inclusive gloss on the letter effectively foreclosed a possible further meto-
nymic meaning of the wall metaphor—inclusivism—and, indeed, fifty years later the
Court would construct a very different meaning in its place.
By the middle of the twentieth century, the Court had survived the difficult early
years of the New Deal and emerged with a profoundly enlarged conception of federal
authority.  Encouraged by Justice Hugo Black, it began to incorporate the protections
of the Bill of Rights into those substantive liberties the Fourteenth Amendment guards
from state encroachment.59  The Establishment Clause, however, settled awkwardly
into Black’s vision of “total” incorporation—which mechanically enforced the first
eight amendments against the states in their entirety—precisely because the clause
51 Id.
52 Id. at 167. It is perhaps ironic that, had Waite treated Reynolds as an establishment case,
the interpretation of Jefferson’s “substantive” position might have precluded the government
from establishing a particular religious conception of marriage.
53 Roberts v. Bradfield, 12 App. D.C. 453 (1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 291 (1899). The Court
reasoned (somewhat unpersuasively) that the hospital was serving a secular (but not a religious)
purpose. Id. at 471–72.
54 Id. at 466–67.
55 Id. at 467 (emphasis added).
56 See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 44, at 91; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1153–55 (2d ed. 2002).
57 Bartrum, supra note 19, at 108.
58 See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
59 PETER CHARLES HOFFER ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT 324–25 (2007).
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was originally meant to reserve a specific power (religious legislation) to the states
within the federalist structure.60  Black’s model of incorporation, however, would
now strip the states of precisely this power.61  For this result to make sense, the Court
needed to flesh out some kind of “individual” disestablishment right, which the
Fourteenth Amendment would protect from state intrusion.  And, predictably, this
individual right would derive from the substantive federal religious liberty the Court
had begun to fashion in the territories.
Black started to outline the contours of this disestablishment privilege when the
Court incorporated the Establishment Clause in Everson.62  In considering the con-
stitutionality of a New Jersey program that reimbursed parents for the cost of public
transportation to parochial schools, Black began to construct a historical narrative—a
normative ethos—in which to embed the emerging right.63  After painting a dramatic
picture of religious intrigue, persecution, and political redemption in early America,
he reflected on the substance of the religious disestablishment Madison and Jefferson
had envisioned in colonial Virginia.64  Then, to connect these colonial thoughts to the
constitutional founding, he invoked Jefferson’s wall metaphor at the end of a para-
graph that would become a cornerstone of federal disestablishment doctrine:
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment
means at least this:  Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can set up a church.  Neither can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.  Neither
can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess belief or disbelief
in any religion. . . .  In the words of Jefferson, the clause was in-
tended to erect “a wall of separation between Church and State.”65
Here Black chose to employ the wall in support of what is often called a “strict
separationist”—or what I have called an “exclusivist”—view of state neutrality
towards religion, which enforces neutrality by excluding all religious groups from
state aid programs.66  This, of course, is a very different metonymic meaning than
60 See AMAR, supra note 46, at 219 (discussing the difficulty of incorporating the
Establishment Clause in the way Black envisioned).
61 Id. (discussing Black’s interpretation that the Establishment Clause was intended to
protect citizens against state power).
62 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
63 After all, as Robert Cover reminds us, every nomos—or communal legal structure—
requires a justifying narrative. Robert Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (1983).
64 Everson, 330 U.S. at 11–15. Here, Black relied on two other canonical establishment
texts: Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments and Jefferson’s
Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom. Id. at 12.
65 Id. at 15–16 (emphasis added).
66 Bartrum, supra note 19, at 109.
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that which the appellate court had suggested in Bradfield.  Nonetheless, the Everson
majority upheld the New Jersey busing program as providing merely an incidental
benefit to religion67—an outcome that provoked a sharp dissent from Justice Wiley
Rutledge, who preferred an even stricter separation.68  Rutledge, too, utilized the wall
metaphor, lamenting that “[n]either so high nor so impregnable today as yesterday is
the wall raised between church and state by . . . the First Amendment,”69 but he went
further by explicitly rejecting Bradfield’s inclusivist conception:
The problem . . . cannot be cast in terms of legal discrimination or
its absence.  This would be true, even though the state in giving
aid should treat all religious instruction alike.  Thus, if the pres-
ent statute and its application were shown to apply equally to all
religious schools of whatever faith, yet in the light of our tradition
it could not stand. . . .  [I]t was the furnishing of “contributions
of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves”
that the fathers outlawed.  That consequence and effect are not
removed by multiplying to all-inclusiveness the sects for which
support is exacted.  The Constitution requires, not comprehensive
identification of state with religion, but complete separation.70
Just a year later the Court would consolidate the letter’s canonical status as
an exclusivist metonym in McCollum v. Board of Education, a case that tested the
constitutionality of an Illinois program that brought private teachers into public
schools for voluntary weekly religion classes.71  McCollum’s various opinions both
cement the wall’s place in the canon and clarify its metonymic meaning for future
establishment argument.  Writing again for the majority, Justice Black repeated the
foundational paragraph from Everson, adding by way of explanation that “the First
Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and government can best work
to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective
sphere.”72  And he concluded with a rhetorical return to the now exclusivist symbol-
ism of the Jefferson letter—the “wall between Church and State . . . must be kept high
and impregnable”—before invalidating the Illinois program.73
67 Everson, 330 U.S. at 17–18.
68 Id. at 49–50 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 29.
70 Id. at 59–60 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
71 333 U.S. 203 (1948). The program brought in privately funded instructors to teach
Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish classes one day a week to the children of requesting parents.
Students who elected not to participate received secular instruction in another classroom. Id.
at 207–09.
72 Id. at 212.
73 Id.
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Black’s short opinion was not enough for the Everson dissenters, however, who
hoped to both fortify and expand exclusivist principles.  Justice Felix Frankfurter
began by suggesting that the Constitution must prohibit more than just the establish-
ment of a national church, and proceeded to add metonymic mortar to the wall:
We are all agreed that the First and Fourteenth Amendments have
a secular reach far more penetrating in the conduct of Government
than merely to forbid an “established church.”  But agreement,
in the abstract, that the First Amendment was designed to erect
a “wall of separation between church and State,” does not pre-
clude a clash of views as to what the wall separates. . . .  We can-
not illuminatingly apply the “wall-of-separation” metaphor until
we have considered the relevant history of religious education
in America.74
And the historical narrative Frankfurter then presented—centered on the supposed
battle to secularize public education against “fierce sectarian opposition”75—gave
Jefferson’s words a decidedly exclusivist gloss, as did Justice Frankfurter’s conclud-
ing thoughts:  “Separation means separation, not something less.  Jefferson’s
metaphor in describing the relation between Church and State speaks of a ‘wall of
separation,’ not of a fine line easily overstepped. . . . It is the Court’s duty to enforce
this principle in its full integrity.”76
Not everyone was thrilled with the Danbury letter’s emergence as an exclusivist
metonym, however.  Justice Robert Jackson, in concurrence, did not find the symbol
so easy to interpret:
It is idle to pretend that this task is one for which we can find in
the Constitution one word to help us as judges to decide where
the secular ends and the sectarian begins in education.  Nor can
we find guidance in any other legal source.  It is a matter on which
we can find no law but our own prepossessions.  If with no surer
legal guidance we are to take up and decide every variation of this
controversy . . . we are likely to make the legal “wall of separation
between church and state” as winding as the famous serpentine
wall designed by Mr. Jefferson for the University he founded.77
74 Id. at 213 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
75 Id. at 214. This battle was actually an effort to exclude Catholic teaching from what
were universally acknowledged to be Protestant public schools, in which the King James Bible
and Book of Common Prayer were central texts. See Ian Bartrum, The Political Origins of
Secular Public Education: The New York School Controversy 1840–42, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 267, 286–320 (2008).
76 McCollum, 333 U.S. at 231.
77 Id. at 237–38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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And Justice Stanley Reed, the lone dissenter, articulated real—and well-founded—
historical reservations about the letter’s crystallizing metonymic meaning:  “A read-
ing of the general statements of eminent statesmen of former days . . . will show that
circumstances such as those in this case were far from the minds of the authors.  The
words and spirit of those statements may be wholeheartedly accepted without in the
least impugning [the Illinois program].”78  Reed went on to present a different history
than had Frankfurter; using other materials, he demonstrated that Jefferson envis-
aged a significant role for religion in the classrooms of the University of Virginia.79 
“Thus,” Reed concluded:
the “wall of separation between church and State” that Mr.
Jefferson built at the University which he founded did not ex-
clude religious education from that school.  The difference be-
tween the generality of his statements on the separation of church
and state and the specificity of his conclusions on education are
considerable.  A rule of law should not be drawn from a figure
of speech.80
But these doubts ran against the argumentative tide, and soon both sides of the
neutrality debate would come to accept Jefferson’s wall as a powerful symbol of ex-
clusivism.  Over the next forty years, the Danbury letter made an appearance in ex-
clusivist majority opinions that struck down school prayer,81 nonsectarian graduation
prayers,82 public funding for Catholic school field trips,83 a church’s veto power over
neighboring establishments’ liquor licenses,84 and tax benefits to parochial school
parents85—and in exclusivist dissents against decisions that upheld the loan of text-
books to Catholic schools,86 prayer at the opening of a state legislature,87 and a pri-
vate party’s display of a cross on state capitol grounds.88  Indeed, as is true with many
78 Id. at 244 (Reed, J., dissenting).
79 Id. at 245–48.
80 Id. at 247.
81 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962).
82 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 600–01 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
83 Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S.
793 (2000).
84 Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 122–23 (1982).
85 Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 761 (1973).
86 Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 251 (Black, J., dissenting).
87 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 802 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan out-
lined four purposes of the exclusive neutrality doctrine: (1) to prevent compelled support for
another religion; (2) to prevent state interference with religious autonomy; (3) to protect
religion from the degradation of state association; and (4) to prevent political divisiveness.
Id. at 803–06.
88 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 797 (1995) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
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symbols, the power of the wall’s metonymic meaning is perhaps most apparent in the
inclusivist opposition’s vigorous efforts to tear it down.
The Court’s seminal, and still paradigmatic, statement of inclusive neutrality
appeared in 1952, just a few years after McCollum.  In Zorach v. Clauson, five
Justices upheld a New York City program that permitted the children of requesting
parents to leave school to receive weekly instruction at private religious centers.89 
Writing for the majority, Justice William Douglas began by acknowledging the
exclusivist shadow of Jefferson’s wall, but quickly began to pick at a few cracks in
the mortar:  “The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all re-
spects there shall be a separation of Church and State. . . .  That is the common sense of
the matter.  Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each other—hostile,
suspicious, and even unfriendly.”90  He then wrote a paragraph that has become an
inclusivist cornerstone:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being.  We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. 
We make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the
spiritual needs of man deem necessary.  We sponsor an attitude
on the part of government that shows no partiality to any one group
and that lets each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents
and the appeal of its dogma.  When the state encourages religious
instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting
the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best
of our traditions.  For it then respects the religious nature of our
people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. 
To hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a
requirement that the government show a callous indifference to
religious groups.  That would be preferring those who believe in
no religion over those who do believe.91
For Douglas, exclusive neutrality was simply illogical:  exclusivism could not claim
to be truly neutral while forthrightly promoting a secular worldview.  And, signifi-
cantly, rather than try to incorporate the metaphor into his own argument, Douglas
simply chose to ignore it.  No longer even suggesting the nonpreferential reading
from Bradfield—which would erect the wall between the state and sectarianism—
Douglas surrendered the Danbury letter to exclusivism.
89 343 U.S. 306 (1952). The challenged program was similar to the one struck down in
McCollum, except in Zorach the religious instruction did not occur in the public school
building. Id. at 308–09.
90 Id. at 312.
91 Id. at 313–14.
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Justice Potter Stewart kept inclusivism alive in his two scathing dissents in the
school prayer decisions of the 1960s, though, for the time being, he did not mount
another direct attack on Jefferson’s wall.92  Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, the
inclusivist siege began in earnest.  Writing for the majority in Lynch v. Donnelly—a
decision upholding a nativity scene on city property—Chief Justice Warren Burger
offered the following thoughts:  “The concept of a ‘wall’ of separation is a useful
figure of speech probably deriving from views of Thomas Jefferson. . . . But the
metaphor itself is not a wholly accurate description of the practical aspects of the
relationship that in fact exists between church and state.”93  Eschewing draconian
exclusivism, Burger argued that “the Constitution [does not] require complete sepa-
ration of church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely
tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any.”94
But it was soon-to-be-Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s historically-minded
dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree—in which the majority struck down moments of silence
at a public school—that truly defined the modern opposition to Jefferson’s wall and
began its decanonization.95  From the outset, Rehnquist challenged the Danbury
letter’s historical pedigree:
It is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a
mistaken understanding of constitutional history, but unfortu-
nately the Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted with
Jefferson’s misleading metaphor for nearly 40 years.  Thomas
Jefferson was of course in France at the time the constitutional
Amendments known as the Bill of Rights were passed by Congress
and ratified by the States.  His letter to the Danbury Baptist
Association was a short note of courtesy, written 14 years after
the Amendments were passed by Congress.  He would seem to
any detached observer as a less than ideal source of contempo-
rary history as to the meaning of the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment.96
Rehnquist turned instead to James Madison—who had, he thought, “two advantages
over Jefferson in this regard:  he was present in the United States, and he was a lead-
ing Member of the First Congress”—and looked particularly at Madison’s efforts
to craft a disestablishment amendment during the first session of Congress.97  A
92 Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 313 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 445 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
93 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984).
94 Id. (emphasis added).
95 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
96 Id. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
97 Id. at 92–95.
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review of the brief record of congressional debates satisfied Rehnquist that the First
Amendment’s “most important architect . . . did not see it as requiring neutrality on
the part of the government between religion and irreligion.”98  Indeed, Rehnquist
argued that the language proposed by the various states—which Madison seemed
to endorse—reveals an amendment designed not to discourage religious observance,
but to prevent sectarian preferentialism.99
Not content to rest with Madison, however, Rehnquist offered two additional
pieces of historical evidence to discredit the exclusivist wall.  First, he looked to the
Northwest Ordinance—enacted on the same day that the First Congress took up the
First Amendment—as a true indication of congressional intentions regarding the
substance of federal disestablishment.100  Again, because the federal government
exercised State-like plenary power in the territories, it was here that the contours of
federal church-state relations took shape.101  Rehnquist pointed to the Ordinance’s
declaration that “[r]eligion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good gov-
ernment and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall for-
ever be encouraged” as evidence that Congress intended to actively encourage religion
in the territories.102  And, second, Rehnquist turned to a House of Representatives reso-
lution (proposed just a day later) that asked President George Washington to issue
a proclamation giving “Almighty God their sincere thanks for the many blessings
98 Id. at 97–98. Ironically, a review of the very same materials would convince Leonard
Levy that the Establishment Clause has a distinctly exclusivist meaning. LEVY, supra note
44, at 73–75. Levy argues that these debates demonstrate conclusively that Congress had no
power to legislate on religion, and that Rehnquist’s “nonpreferential” account depends upon
some additional congressional authority. Id. at 84. While clever, Levy’s argument has serious
logical flaws. Although the original Establishment Clause—as a federalism provision—
undoubtedly reserved authority over religion to the states, to suggest that the structural aspects
of the federal amendment speak to the substance of church-state relations (again, an issue left
to the states) is simply a category mistake. See Bartrum, supra note 19, at 119 n.86.
99 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 93 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Virginia and North Carolina proposed
identical language ensuring that “no particular religious sect or society ought to be favored or
established, by law, in preference of others.” Virginia Ratification Convention, Amendments
Proposed (July 27, 1788), in 3 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
659 (Jonathon Elliot ed., reprint ed. 1987); North Carolina Declaration of Rights (Aug. 1,
1788), in 4 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra, at 244. New
York and Rhode Island likewise suggested that no “religious sect or society ought to be favored
or established, by law, in preference to others.” New York Ratification of the Constitution
of the United States (July 26, 1788), in 1 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, supra, at 328; Ratification of the Constitution by the Convention of the State
of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations (May 29, 1790), in 1 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra, at 334.
100 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 100 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
101 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
102 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 100 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Northwest Ordinance 1
Stat. 50 (1789)).
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he had poured down upon them.”103  The House passed the resolution just over a
month later, and President Washington issued the proclamation within a few weeks.104 
All of this was proof enough for Rehnquist that there was “simply no historical foun-
dation for the . . . ‘wall of separation’ that was constitutionalized in Everson.”105 
Indeed, rather than try to reclaim or refine the wall metonym, Rehnquist hoped simply
to relegate Jefferson’s words to the constitutional dustbin:  “We have done much
straining since 1947, but still we admit that we can only dimly perceive the Everson
wall.  Our perception has been clouded not by the Constitution but by the mists of
an unnecessary metaphor.”106
By 2000, the Court’s ideological center had moved towards Rehnquist, and in-
clusivist efforts to dismantle the metonymic wall began to meet with more success. 
Mitchell v. Helms upheld a Louisiana program that provided teaching materials to
religious and secular schools on an equal basis,107 and Good News Club v. Milford
Central School required a New York school that opened its gymnasium to community
groups after hours to include religious groups on an equal basis.108  Justice Clarence
Thomas’s majority opinion in the latter case eagerly endorsed inclusive neutrality: 
“Because allowing [religious groups] to speak on school grounds would ensure neutral-
ity, not threaten it, Milford faces an uphill battle in arguing that the Establishment
Clause compels it to exclude [these groups].”109  As a result of these changes on the
Court—including a calculated shift towards free speech analysis110—exclusivists have
found themselves increasingly called upon to defend the wall, and the once hard spot
in the constitutional canon has begun to loosen and shift.  So much so that in Van
Orden v. Perry, a 2005 decision that upheld the display of a monument of the Ten
Commandments on the Texas state capitol grounds,111 dissenting Justice John Paul
Stevens was left desperately plugging holes in the eroding metonymic wall:  “If any
fragment of Jefferson’s metaphorical ‘wall of separation between church and State’
is to be preserved—if there remains any meaning to the wholesome ‘neutrality’ of
103 Id. at 100–01 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 914 (1789)). Elias Boudinot, who proposed
the resolution, also voted in favor of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 101.
104 Id. at 101–02. John Adams, Washington’s successor, would also issue official procla-
mations of thanksgiving. Id. at 103.
105 Id. at 106.
106 Id. at 112 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
107 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
108 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
109 Id. at 114.
110 See Ian Bartrum, Pleasant Grove v. Summum: Losing the Battle to Win the War, 95
VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 43 (2009), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2009/05/16/bartrum
.pdf. This line of doctrine runs from Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) through Lamb’s
Chapel v. Ctr. for Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993), and Rosenberger v.
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) to Good News Club, 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
111 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
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which this Court’s [Establishment Clause] cases speak—[the Texas display must
come down].”112
All of this is, I hope, a useful illustration of the emergence, evolution, and incip-
ient decline of a canonical metonym within the historical modality of constitutional
practice.  Originally introduced as a means of bridging the gap between state and
federal disestablishment principles, Jefferson’s Danbury letter—with its concise and
powerful image of “a wall of separation between church and state”—fell quickly and
neatly into the rhythms of constitutional argument.  Over a few short years, metonymic
associations began to accrete around the wall and cemented its place in the canon as
seemingly imperturbable evidence of a founding commitment to exclusive neutrality. 
And, as is often the case, these emerging metonymic meanings were far removed from
the letter’s original or literal meaning, which was a structural description of the relative
authority of state and federal government over religious matters.  It is, after all, not so
much the letter’s historical significance, but rather its utility as a piece on the argu-
mentative chess board, that ensured its place in the canon.  But, perhaps inevitably,
as the wall’s power and influence became more apparent, exclusivism’s ideological
opponents made concerted efforts to discredit or dislodge it:  in effect, to de-canonize
it.  While the focus of these particular efforts has been simply to devalue the wall as
constitutional currency, the next section—which examines the evolution of a canonical
piece of doctrine—illustrates the sometimes more powerful technique of refining
metonymic meanings to conform to a changing constitutional culture.
II. DOCTRINE:  THE LEGAL ACADEMY, LOCHNER, AND CANONICAL REFINEMENT
Of Bobbitt’s six modalities, doctrinal argument, with its emphasis on stare decisis
and neutral principles, relies perhaps more than any other on canonical texts, some of
which have come to be known as “superprecedents.”113  But, for these same reasons, it
may be surprising to discover that cases, too, can take on metonymic meanings divorced
from their literal texts.  Indeed, precisely because the skilled doctrinalist must be expert
at distilling and recharacterizing precedents and neutral “tests,” it is in this modality
that some of the most dramatic recalibrations of metonymic meaning occur over time. 
This section examines one of the most canonical, or more precisely “anti-canonical,”
decisions rendered during the last century.  Despite some recent rehabilitation,114
112 Id. at 708 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
113 Rosen, supra note 5.
114 See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 101 (1991) (arguing
the Court was properly fulfilling its “preservationist” function in our dualist Democracy);
BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT (1998) (attributing Lochner Era de-
cisions to weakening police powers doctrine); 8 OWEN M. FISS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–1910,
at 19 (1993) (describing Lochner as a reasonable “attempt to explicate and protect the consti-
tutional ideal of liberty”); David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner
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Lochner v. New York115 remains among the more vicious doctrinal epithets one can
hurl at a constitutional opponent.116  But the accusation has changed over time, and in
what follows I explore the ways that our constitutional practice, particularly in the
academic sphere, has refined Lochner’s metonymic meaning over the course of the
last century.
Indeed, it is perhaps true that no case illustrates the metonymic nature of the con-
stitutional canon better than Lochner.  It has lent its name to an entire chapter of con-
stitutional history:  the so-called Lochner Era.117  But what exactly are the associated
meanings to which the metonym points us?  What do we mean when we accuse
someone of “Lochnering”?118  Some modern commentators have suggested that the
case’s metonymic meaning remains unclear; that it is difficult to say with any cer-
tainty what is wrong with Lochner.119  But this confusion is, I think, rhetorical, as
scholars struggle to draw a principled distinction between the Court’s efforts to protect
the liberty of contract in the early twentieth century, and its determination to enforce
civil and reproductive rights under Earl Warren and Warren Burger.120  I suggest that,
in truth, all of these uncertainties—the revilement, the revision, the distinctions, and
the clarifications—are simply part of an ongoing battle to distill Lochner’s metonymic
meanings within constitutional practice.  They are a manifestation of the continuing
struggle to reclaim or refine the “hard” spot the case occupies in the constitutional
riverbank; the perpetual effort to define what Lochner stands for, or, more impor-
tantly, what it stands against.
and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1 (2003) (locating
Lochner in the fundamental rights tradition of substantive due process); James W. Ely, Jr.,
Reflections on Buchanan v. Warley, Property Rights, and Race, 51 VAND. L. REV. 953, 967
(1998) (describing conventional accounts of the Lochner Era as winner’s history); G. Edward
White, Revisiting Substantive Due Process and Holmes’s Lochner Dissent, 63 BROOK. L.
REV. 87 (1997) (challenging historical disapproval of Lochner).
115 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
116 See David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373 (2003)
(“Lochner v. New York would probably win the prize, if there were one, for the most widely
reviled decision of the last hundred years.”).
117 There is some dispute as to when this phrase arose, but it gained widespread acceptance
after Gerald Gunther used it in the 1970 edition of his popular casebook. GERALD GUNTHER
& NOEL T. DOWLING, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 983 (8th ed. 1970);
accord David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial Retrospective, 83 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1469, 1518 (2005).
118 ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 269; accord HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION
BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 4 (1993)
(using the term “Lochnerizing”).
119 Strauss, supra note 116, at 374 (“The striking thing about the disapproval of Lochner,
though, is that there is no consensus on why it is wrong.”).
120 See id. at 374 (“The puzzle, for anyone who generally accepts the way constitutional
law has evolved over the last half century or so, is to find an argument against Lochner that
would not undermine those developments as well.”).
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Having said all this, I believe that most lawyers—those blissfully unversed in
the mounting academic literature—understand Lochner as a metonym for unbridled
judicial activism; a shorthand description of a court overreaching its constitutional
authority and thwarting majority will as represented in the legislature.121  As such, the
Lochner metonym reflects the core of the countermajoritarian objection to judicial
review,122 and its edge cuts against the advocate who would use the courts to further
certain social or political agendas.  And, because its invocation challenges a court’s
very legitimacy when it reaches certain kinds of decisions or provides certain kinds
of relief, Lochner has become a fascinating and powerful argumentative tool.  In what
follows, I trace Lochner’s journey into infamy and the constitutional anti-canon, but
I also hope to account for more recent efforts to refine or distill it metonymically.  In
the process, I will suggest that Lochner provides a particularly striking example of
the legal academy’s impact on the constitutional canon and, by extension, constitu-
tional meaning.123  But, as before, I begin by putting the case’s original or literal mean-
ing in constitutional context.
The Lochner story begins during the late 1870s, when journeymen bakers in New
York and other major cities began to unionize and push for labor reforms.124  The largest
and most powerful union to emerge consisted predominantly of German bakers—
indeed, it was initially known in the press as the National Union of German Bakers—
and in January of 1886, its members convened to seek a reduction of the average
workday.125  Despite some modern dispute,126 it seems reasonably clear that the
121 See Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day it Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional
Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 686 (2005) (arguing that the conventional account suggests
that “the Justices during the Lochner Era repeatedly overstepped their appropriate roles as
judges by reading their own political values into the Constitution”).
122 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23 (2d ed. Yale Univ. Press 1986) (1962) (describing the “Counter-
Majoritarian Difficulty”).
123 As I have suggested elsewhere, there are many spheres or institutions of constitutional
discourse and argument, among which are the academy, the courts, the bar, the legislature, and
the executive branch. Bartrum, supra note 7, at 161.
124 STUART BRUCE KAUFMAN, A VISION OF UNITY: THE HISTORY OF THE BAKERY AND
CONFECTIONERY WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION 1–5 (1986).
125 Id. at 6. It is worth noting that the maximum hours issue was the catalyst for a great
deal of the union organizing that occurred in the late nineteenth century. See, e.g., DAVID R.
ROEDIGER & PHILIP S. FONER, OUR OWN TIME: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR AND THE
WORKING DAY 19–42 (1989). “[I]ncreasing attention to the hours issue was the key element
in the transformation of labor’s consciousness and organization . . . .” Id. at 19; accord PAUL
KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF LOCHNER V. NEW YORK 22
(1990) (“To a great extent early labor unions had organized around the issue of the eight-hour
workday.”). In John Swinton’s Paper, a Michigan baker recounted the particular struggles
faced in his industry: “We are having quite a time here with our bosses. One of them got wind
that we were going to ask for shorter hours, and the first thing he did was to discharge one of
our boys. . . . I think very likely that there will be a boycott thrown . . . by the K[nights] of
L[abor].” Journeymen Bakers’ National Union, JOHN SWINTON’S PAPER, July 10, 1887.
126 Matthew Bewig, for example, contends that the bakers’ principal motivations were
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bakers had both economic and republican goals in mind.127  In a call to arms, the
German American Baker’s Journal—the English language version of the union organ
Deutsche-Amerikanische Baeckerzeitung—presented the resolutions that compelled
the newly named Journeymen Bakers National Union to submit a maximum hours
bill to the New York legislature in 1887:128
Whereas, It is a well-known fact that the excessive work in
the baker shops is undermining health and shortening the live
[sic] of those employed therein.
Whereas, The journeymen bakers were hitherto compelled
to work too many hours, in consequence of which those having
employment had to perform the work of two men while a great
many had to go idle for want of work.
Whereas, As a result of this great abuse one part of the jour-
neymen bakers ruined themselves by overwork, while the other
portion, being idle, were a prey to abject misery through the en-
forced idleness.
Whereas, In consequence of this state of affairs, those em-
ployed in bakeries were bodily and mentally degenerated to a
degree unworthy of citizens belonging to a free commonwealth.
Be it
Resolved, That we look upon the bill now before the Legisla-
ture, making ten hours a day’s work in bakeries, as a measure to
elevate the condition of journeymen bakers bodily and mentally,
which should be adopted without delay by the Assembly after its
passage by the Senate.
Resolved, That the law is not only a measure for the interest
of public health, but it will also be in the interest of morality and
civilization, securing liberty to a class literally enslaved by their
calling.129
republican and communal. See Matthew S. Bewig, Lochner v. The Journeymen Bakers of
New York: The Journeymen Bakers, Their Hours of Labor, and the Constitution, 38 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 413, 419 (1994). Richard Epstein argues that larger, unionized bakers (who did
not often work more than ten hours per day) simply hoped to drive smaller “basement” bakeries
(that relied on longer hours) out of business. See Richard Epstein, The Mistakes of 1937, GEO.
MASON L. REV., Winter 1988, at 5, 17–18. Paul Kens strikes a seemingly sensible path some-
where down the middle of these two positions. See KENS, supra note 125, at 15.
127 Bewig, supra note 126, at 431–32.
128 It appears that, going into the union convention, some bakers worked “as many as
eighteen hours every day,” and thus resolved to settle for a ten or twelve-hour work day as
anything shorter simply “could not be gained.” George G. Block, The Bakers, JOHN SWINTON’S
PAPER, Feb. 17, 1886.
129 The Grand Mass-Meeting, GERMAN AMERICAN BAKERS’ JOURNAL, Apr. 27, 1887;
accord Bewig, supra note 126, at 431 (quoting a later, modified version of the resolution).
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While it is fascinating to note how these arguments track the issues that would
eventually animate and (perhaps unconsciously) divide the Supreme Court, the first
bakery bill failed to capture a majority of the state assembly, and the journeymen
bakers left Albany empty handed.130
It would take eight years and a series of muckraking newspaper reports by New
York Press editor Edward Marshall—likely coordinated with Union leader Henry
Weismann—to generate sufficient public outcry behind a renewed push for maximum
hours legislation.131  In late September of 1894, Marshall published a vivid description
of the wretched and unhealthy conditions prevalent in tenement basement bakeries
under the provocative headline “Bread and Filth Cooked Together.”132  Marshall de-
scribed a visit to one shop he found infested by “cockroaches about an inch long,” and
another whose foreman claimed to work twelve hours a day, seven days a week, for a
monthly wage of eight dollars.133  He followed up with a series of reports on the dangers
that the basement bakeries—and the wage slaves working interminable hours within—
presented to public health and the moral community.134  These articles and corrobo-
rating state inspections eventually prompted public calls for the legislature to again
consider action to reform the baking industry.135
New York lawmakers largely based the Bakeshop Act, as it was called, on similar
regulations enacted in England136—with the major addition of a provision limiting
the time “biscuit, bread or cake bakery” employees could work to ten hours in a day
or sixty hours in a week.137  As such a substantial addition, it seems unlikely that the
130 Bewig, supra note 126, at 431. The bill passed the Senate but failed in the assembly
56–45. Id.
131 KENS, supra note 125, at 50–53; accord Bernstein, supra note 117, at 1479. Indeed,
Marshall’s first article on the subject explicitly claimed to be in response to a letter from
Weismann asking the paper to “bring to light the filth of the bake shops.” Edward Marshall,
Bread and Filth Cooked Together, N.Y. PRESS, Sept. 30, 1894, §4, at 1.
132 Marshall, supra note 131. The plight of the tenements and their occupants was a common
theme in the labor press as well. See, e.g., Pest Breeding Tenements: The Worst in the World—
Not One Word Spoken in their Favor, JOHN SWINTON’S PAPER, Dec. 20, 1885; Pest Breeding
Tenements: Denounced by All—Another Batch of Testimony, JOHN SWINTON’S PAPER, Jan. 3,
1886. The effort to link bakery work with the general tenement problem was therefore a well-
calculated one. See KENS, supra note 125, at 50–52.
133 Marshall, supra note 131.
134 KENS, supra note 125, at 51–52.
135 Bernstein, supra note 117, at 1479–81.
136 Id. at 1481.
137 The first section of the Bakeshop Act read as follows:
No employe[e] shall be required, permitted or suffered to work in a
biscuit, bread, or cake bakery or confectionery establishment more than
sixty hours in any one week, or more than ten hours in any one day,
unless for the purpose of making a shorter work day on the last day of
the week, nor more hours in any one week than will make an average 
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hours limitation was a trivial or unnoticed inclusion in the bill—although it does seem
slightly out of keeping with the Act’s other sanitary regulations138—or that it was
included at the eleventh hour to appease Union lobbyists.  Indeed, the provision occu-
pied a place of prominence as Section One, and there is evidence that the word “person”
in the first sentence was changed to “employe[e]” to allay last minute constitutional
concerns.139  This final change assumes all the more significance because it seems to
have been nearly the only issue of concern to lawmakers, as the bill sailed unani-
mously through both the senate (29–0) and the state assembly (90–0) and became
law on May 2, 1895.140  The somewhat surprising universal support, which would
later provide ammunition for the Court’s countermajoritarian critics, likely resulted
from a lack of political organization among bakery owners; the division of interests
between large bakeshops and smaller basement bakeries; and the thought that state
regulation would better the reputation, and thus the profits, of bakers generally.141
The Act’s final provisions authorized its enforcement through the routine visits
of state factory inspectors and their deputies,142 whose reports show that for the first
few years the new law was fairly ineffective.143  In fact, in 1897 only 312 of the 855
bakeries inspected complied with the maximum hours provision.144  By 1899, it appears
that most of the unionized bakeries observed the ten-hour limit,145 though it is less
clear what was happening in the city basements.  In practice, it was the Union’s, rather
than the State’s, enforcement efforts that were the key to the law’s success in those
areas where it was observed.  The state Factory Inspector himself conceded as much: 
“The hours of labor in bakeshops cannot be successfully regulated in my opinion but
in one way, and that is by a thorough and complete organization by the craft itself.”146 
of ten hours per day for the whole number of days in which such person
shall so work during such week.
N.Y. LAWS, ch. 415, art. 8, § 110 (1895) [hereinafter Bakeshop Act], reprinted in KENS, supra
note 125, at 169.
138 Other sections mandate that there be proper plumbing and drainage; that certain building
materials be used for floors, walls, and ceilings; that flour and meal be kept in dry rooms; that
restrooms be set apart from rooms used for baking, among other sanitary regulations. See id.
at 169–70; see also Paul Kens, Lochner v. New York: Tradition or Change in Constitutional
Law?, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 404, 407 (2005).
139 KENS, supra note 125, at 58. This change allowed bakery owners to continue working
as long as they wished. Id.
140 Id. at 59.
141 Bernstein, supra note 117, at 1482–83.
142 Bakeshop Act, reprinted in KENS, supra note 125, at 170.
143 ROEDIGER & FONER, supra note 125, at 157.
144 Id.; Sidney G. Tarrow, Lochner Versus New York: A Political Analysis, 5 LAB. HIST.
277, 289 (1964). This was partly a problem of getting workers to report their employers. Id.
at 288.
145 Tarrow, supra note 144, at 290; accord ROEDIGER & FONER, supra note 125, at 157.
146 Testimony of Daniel O’Leary, Factory Inspector of the State of New York, before the
U.S. Industrial Commission, Mar. 8, 1899, quoted in Tarrow, supra note 144, at 289.
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But it was perhaps in this capacity, as a rallying point for Union activity and member-
ship, that the Bakeshop Act was most significant and presented the biggest threat to
laissez-faire economics and the bakery owners.147
In the meantime, those owners had begun to accumulate more political power,
including the defection to their ranks of the shrewd and influential Union leader Henry
Weismann, who had been instrumental in getting the Bakeshop Act passed.148  Judicial
events also began to inspire hope in the newly formed Master Bakers Association
that organized opposition to the sixty-hour limitation might eventually bring it
down.149  Picking up on Justices Stephen Field’s and Joseph Bradley’s dissents in the
Slaughterhouse Cases150 and Munn v. Illinois,151 some state courts had begun to find
merit in Thomas Cooley’s ideas about constitutional property rights and what would
come to be known as “substantive due process.”152  To protect the “constitutional
privilege” of contract, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had invalidated legislation
prohibiting payments in the form of company store credit;153 the Nebraska Supreme
Court had struck down an hours limitation for mechanics and laborers;154 and the
Illinois Supreme Court had invalidated a similar restriction for women factory
workers.155  Closer to home, the New York Court of Appeals had upheld some
147 Tarrow, supra note 144, at 290.
148 KENS, supra note 125, at 98–99; accord Tarrow, supra note 144, at 290. Weismann
had a falling out with the Union over corruption charges and resigned in 1897. He then opened
a bakery of his own and began to appreciate the owners’ side of the issue. KENS, supra note
125, at 98–99.
149 Tarrow, supra note 144, at 291–93.
150 83 U.S. 36, 105–06 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause must jealously guard the “sacred right of labor”); id. at 116 (Bradley, J.,
dissenting) (locating the right to property among “the fundamental rights which can only be
taken away by due process of law”).
151 94 U.S. 113, 136 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting) (finding doctrine that allows legislative
regulation of businesses affected with the public interest “subversive of the rights of private
property”). For a useful history of these developments in the Supreme Court, see EDWARD
S. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT: THE RISE, FLOWERING, AND DECLINE OF A
FAMOUS JURIDICAL CONCEPT 130–45 (1948).
152 See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 508–10
(7th ed. 1903) (developing the idea of substantive limitations on legislatures that protect
certain “vested rights” encompassed in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause). As
late as 1948, Edward Corwin would call Cooley’s book—originally published in 1868—“the
most influential treatise ever published on American constitutional law.” CORWIN, supra note
151, at 116. On the seeds of substantive due process, see KENS, supra note 125, at 87–89,
though it is worth noting that the doctrine did not formally distinguish between “substantive”
and “procedural” due process until the 1950s. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
NEW DEAL 245 (2000).
153 Godcharles v. Wigeman, 6 A. 354, 356 (Pa. 1886).
154 Low v. Rees Printing Co., 59 N.W. 362 (Neb. 1894).
155 Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454 (Ill. 1895). Other notable state cases vindicating the
liberty of contract were: Leep v. St. Lewis Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co., 25 S.W. 75 (Ark.
1894); State v. Haun, 59 P. 340 (Kan. 1899); Commonwealth v. Perry, 28 N.E. 1126 (Mass.
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workplace regulations as within the state police power,156 but was generally gaining
a reputation as hostile towards legislation abridging the right to sell one’s labor.157 
And the United States Supreme Court, which had grudgingly upheld labor laws through
the 1880s,158 finally seemed to turn in the master bakers’ favor when it struck down
a Louisiana law that interfered with the fundamental “right to contract.”159  True enough,
the Court subsequently upheld a maximum hours law governing Utah miners,160 but
overall judicial developments augured well enough for the master bakers that by 1901
they were ready to challenge the Bakeshop Act in state court.161
Joseph Lochner operated a non-union bakery in Utica, New York, and he had
steadily resisted efforts to enforce the maximum hours provision.162  When the Union
filed a complaint and had him arrested for a second time, the master bakers decided to
use his case to test the Bakeshop Act’s constitutional merits.163  At trial in early 1902,
Lochner offered no plea and no defense, and instead accepted his conviction to set
the stage for an appeal on the question of law.164  His first appeal was to the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court, which split three to two against him.165 
Writing for the majority, Judge John Davy held that the Bakeshop Act, including the
hours limitation, fell within the state legislature’s inherent police powers, and thus
did not violate Lochner’s due process rights.166  But this was not the master bakers’
1891); State v. Loomis, 22 S.W. 350 (Mo. 1893); State v. Fire Creek Coal & Coke Co., 10
S.E. 288 (W. Va. 1889).
156 See, e.g., People v. Havnor, 43 N.E. 541 (N.Y. 1896) (upholding prohibition on
Sunday barber shops in Brooklyn); People v. Ewer, 36 N.E. 4 (N.Y. 1894) (upholding a ban
on child labor in theaters); accord Felice Batlan, A Reevaluation of the New York Court of
Appeals: The Home, The Market, and Labor, 1885–1905, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 489
(2002) (reviewing cases).
157 Of particular renown was In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885), which struck down a law
that banned cigar-making in city tenements. The court also invalidated a minimum wage law
and derided other “paternal” kinds of labor regulations in People ex rel. Rodgers v. Coler, 59
N.E. 716 (N.Y. 1901). Accord Bernstein, supra note 117, at 1489.
158 See, e.g., Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 685 (1888) (upholding prohibition on
oleo margarine sales because it did not “infringe[] rights secured by the fundamental law”);
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (“If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been
enacted to protect the public health . . . is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the funda-
mental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge. . . .”).
159 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 590 (1897) (invalidating prohibition on entering
into insurance contracts with companies not in compliance with state laws).
160 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
161 Tarrow, supra note 144, at 293.
162 Id.
163 Id.; Bernstein, supra note 117, at 1487.
164 Bernstein, supra note 117, at 1487. For accurate trial date, see People v. Lochner, 76
N.Y.S. 396 (1902).
165 Lochner, 76 N.Y.S. 396.
166 Id. The opinion is not entirely clear as to whether it is addressing the equal protection
claim, the due process claim, or both. Based on the cases discussed, however, it appears the
court was more focused on the due process arguments.
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only—or even, perhaps, their strongest—constitutional claim.  Since the Civil War,
courts had grown increasingly suspicious of labor laws that appeared to single out
particular industries for regulation.167  If a law of this kind was deemed arbitrary or
unreasonable, a court might strike it down under the Equal Protection Clause as illegal
“class legislation.”168  Confident of a better reception for both this and their due process
arguments,169 the bakers decided to take their appeal to New York’s highest court.
It was not to be, however, as the Court of Appeals once again upheld Lochner’s
conviction, this time in a four to three split.170  Chief Judge Alton Parker, who would
parlay progressive support into that year’s Democratic presidential nomination,171
wrote the majority opinion rejecting the bakers’ Fourteenth Amendment claims.172 
He began by reviewing both state and federal precedents placing the authority to pro-
tect the public health firmly among the legislature’s police powers.173  Then, relying
particularly on the Supreme Court’s decision in Holden v. Hardy (the Utah mining
case),174 Parker self-consciously deferred to the legislature’s judgments on how best
to ensure healthy bakeries and bakers:
[W]e must assume—even if the object of the legislature in
limiting the hours of work of employe[e]s is not to protect the
health of the general public who take the wares made by such
employe[e]s—that the Legislature intends to protect the health
of the employe[e]s in such establishments; that, for some reason
sufficient to it, it has reached the conclusion that in work of this
character men ought not to be employed more than an average
of 10 hours a day.175
And, given appropriate judicial deference, he concluded that the Bakeshop Act fell
well within the state’s constitutionally reserved police powers.176  In a notable con-
currence that presaged Louis Brandeis’ famous brief of a few years later,177 Judge
167 See GILLMAN, supra note 118, at 62–63.
168 Bernstein, supra note 117, at 1488.
169 It is perhaps worth noting that some courts still styled this as both a due process and
a privileges and immunities claim, despite the near annihilation of the latter clause in the
Slaughterhouse Cases. See People v. Lochner, 69 N.E. 373, 375 (N.Y. 1904) (discussing
right of contract as privileges and immunities claim).
170 Lochner, 69 N.E. at 373.
171 Tarrow, supra note 144, at 295.
172 Lochner, 69 N.E. at 381.
173 Id. at 374–77.
174 169 U.S. 366 (1898); see supra note 160 and accompanying text.
175 Lochner, 69 N.E. at 380.
176 Id.
177 See Brief for Defendant in Error, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (No. 107),
in 16 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 63 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
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Irving Vann provided his own social science data to support the law’s stated purpose.178 
The dissenting judges, by contrast, felt less deferential and more confident in their
own authority to declare the legislature’s health pretensions “a mere disguise that
is not sufficient to save the statute from condemnation.”179
Disheartened by this latest failure, the master bakers’ principal attorney resigned
and advised them not to waste money on what he thought was a hopeless appeal to
the Supreme Court.180  Undaunted, the Master Bakers Association decided to take
up a collection from its membership to fund the federal appeal, and promptly hired
former Union leader Henry Weismann to take the lead.181  In the meantime, the case
garnered growing national attention, partly due to Judge Parker’s presidential campaign,
but also through the bakers’ concerted efforts to publicize their complaint.182  As a re-
sult, the Master Bakers Association remained quietly hopeful as it awaited the Court’s
decision through the early months of 1905; still, in truth, it must have been some-
thing of a pleasant surprise when, on April 17, a divided Court declared the Bakeshop
Act’s first section unconstitutional.183  Justice Rufus Peckham’s majority opinion
analyzed the case, at least in part, under the Due Process Clause, a decision that would
ultimately set Lochner on a collision course with the constitutional anti-canon.184
From the outset, Peckham made it clear that the liberty of contract fell squarely
within the emerging constellation of substantive rights implicit in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process guarantee:
The statute necessarily interferes with the right of contract be-
tween the employer and employe[e]s, concerning the number of
hours in which the latter may labor in the bakery of the employer. 
The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is
part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution.  Under that provision no
State can deprive any person of life, liberty or property without
due process of law.  The right to purchase or to sell labor is part
of the liberty protected by this amendment.185
He conceded that certain inherent state powers—those related to the “safety, health,
morals and general welfare of the public”—might temper this liberty, but such concerns
178 Lochner, 69 N.E. at 382–84 (Vann, J., concurring).
179 Id. at 387 (O’Brien, J., dissenting).
180 Bernstein, supra note 117, at 1491.
181 Id. Sydney Tarrow would later characterize Weismann’s pivotal role in both creating
and destroying the Bakeshop Act as “the choicest irony of all.” Tarrow, supra note 144, at 298.
182 Tarrow, supra note 144, at 295.
183 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
184 Id. at 53; accord Bernstein, supra note 117, at 1497.
185 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 (internal citations omitted).
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could not justify the Bakeshop Act because there was “no fair doubt that the trade of
a baker, in and of itself, is not an unhealthy one.”186  Despite offering this ipse dixit—
and further opining that the Act’s “real object and purpose were simply to regulate
the hours of labor between the master and his employe[e]s”187—Peckham nevertheless
insisted the decision was “not a question of substituting the judgment of the court
for that of the legislature.”188
Four Justices were not convinced, however, and Oliver Wendell Holmes’s short
dissent would, in future years, become as significant within constitutional practice as
the majority opinion.  While his mordant observation that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment
does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics” has perhaps gotten the most
attention, Holmes most clearly expressed the fundamental basis of his dissidence in
the first few sentences:  “I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has
nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law.”189  This
bare statement of judicial conservatism and deference—obviously problematic in its
own right as a constitutional maxim—would provide the theoretical contrast against
which future lawyers would posit the doctrinal sin of “Lochnering.”  Indeed, as
Lochner’s infamy grew, Holmes’s dissent assumed a corresponding place of promi-
nence within the constitutional canon—or perhaps it is the other way around.190
For the time being, however, Holmes and Justice John Marshall Harlan, who
also wrote in dissent, were simply friends of the modern progressive, standing up for
labor against the old guard of the American free market.  And, while perhaps un-
expected, Peckham’s majority opinion was by no means a sharp break with constitu-
tional culture or practice.191  Quixotically, it might even have been seen as the latest
salvo in a libertarian tradition stretching back to abolitionism, one which jealously
guarded a freeman’s right to sell his labor on his own terms.192  Certainly substantive
due process doctrine, and the “liberty of contract” in particular, had juridical opponents
in 1905, but, by any clear-eyed assessment of its literal terms, the Lochner decision
intimated nothing of the ignominy that was to come with the next century of consti-
tutional argument.  And, while much of that disrepute undoubtedly grew out of the
186 Id. at 53, 59.
187 Id. at 64.
188 Id. at 56–57.
189 Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also David Luban, Justice Holmes and the
Metaphysics of Judicial Restraint, 44 DUKE L.J. 449, 461–62 (1994).
190 For a fascinating discussion of the relationship between judicial dissent and canonical
development, see Anita S. Krishnakumar, On the Evolution of the Canonical Dissent, 52
RUTGERS L. REV. 781, 788–90 (2000); Primus, supra note 2, at 252–64.
191 See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 280 (arguing that the Lochner Court was simply
applying the constitutional values bequeathed them by Reconstruction).
192 See, e.g., Charles W. McCurdy, The Roots of “Liberty of Contract” Reconsidered:
Major Premises in the Law of Employment 1867–1937, in SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL
SOCIETY, YEARBOOK 1984, at 20, 26–29 (David T. Pride et al. eds., 1984) (discussing anti-
slavery roots of the liberty of contract).
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decisive shifts in economic circumstance and policy that occurred in the 1930s,
Lochner’s status as an anti-canonical metonym emerged in large part from within
the legal academy.
Although the decision elicited only a muted response from the union press
(perhaps because it had little practical effect),193 it prompted thoughtful and respected
criticism in legal journals.  Ernst Freund published a multifaceted reproach in Green
Bag, in which he took the Court to task on doctrinal, structural, prudential, and even
analytical grounds, ultimately suggesting that “[a] decision which reads into the
Fourteenth Amendment a vague and controverted concept of the liberty of contract,
is a novel, and hardly a fortunate step in the development of our constitutional law.”194 
As a doctrinal matter, Freund argued that Holden v. Hardy195 should have controlled
the outcome in Lochner,196 but of more interest is his structural suggestion that, in
general, the Supreme Court should defer to a state court’s judgment about how broadly
the Fourteenth Amendment restricts the legislative prerogative:
A decision of a state court even of last resort, giving an unduly
wide scope to the rights of liberty or of property as against the
legislative power, is inconclusive in so far as it interprets the
Fourteenth Amendment; and although its construction of the state
constitution is conclusive, that constitution can be changed with
comparative facility . . . .
But a decision of the Supreme Court, interpreting the Four-
teenth Amendment to the prejudice of legislative power, not only
nullifies state constitutional amendments seeking to neutralize the
effect of decisions of state courts, but, in its turn, would be practi-
cally irreversible . . . for the difficulties in the way of changing the
Fourteenth Amendment are almost insuperable.  That amendment
ought, therefore, to be interpreted so as to enforce only that funda-
mental law quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus, which
is uniformly recognized as binding by civilized nations.197
Freund’s thrust here is undoubtedly aimed at judicial activism, though not quite the
same species of politicized activism with which Lochner would later come to be
193 See Tarrow, supra note 144, at 298 (quoting the Baker’s Journal as boasting that the
unions “ha[d] lost nothing by having the ten-hour day declared unconstitutional”). The case
did receive national attention—at least in the short term—in more traditional newspapers. See
Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson
of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1450–51 (2001) (reviewing coverage).
194 Ernst Freund, Limitation of Hours of Labor and the Federal Supreme Court, 17 GREEN
BAG 411, 414 (1905).
195 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
196 Freund, supra note 194, at 412–13.
197 Id. at 414.
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associated.  Rather, he urges a kind of modest structural conservatism—perhaps some-
thing roughly analogous to Alexander Bickel’s prudentialist “passive virtues”198—
although, concededly, Freund does more radically suggest that fundamental due process
rights should be limited to those long recognized by everyone everywhere.199
Equally unimpressed with the liberty of contract’s historical or intellectual pedi-
gree was Roscoe Pound, who began his Lochner commentary by scouring the classics
of natural law theory for the supposedly fundamental right.200  These efforts were,
of course, fruitless; yet Pound had no trouble locating the novel privilege in recent
judicial opinions from around the country.201  He attributed this incongruity to seven
factors,202 the most interesting of which he described as the prevalence of a “mechanical
jurisprudence,” or a “condition of juristic thought and judicial action . . . in which
conceptions are developed logically at the expense of practical results.”203  To Pound’s
mind, judges weaned on the fiction of theoretically absolute common law principles
would hold stubbornly to “predetermined conceptions . . . often in the teeth of the
actual facts.”204  Thus, actual social circumstance and relative bargaining power not-
withstanding, legislative attempts to even the industrial playing field were held to in-
fringe on a theoretical—and so factually unimpeachable—equality.205  Pound’s remedy
for this mechanistic disease was what he called a “sociological jurisprudence”; one
that tailored “principles and doctrines to the human conditions they are to govern
rather than to assumed first principles.”206  The trouble with Lochner, then, was not
that the Court was too activist, but that it was too conservative.  A blind adherence to
formalistic principles and traditional categories not only impeded political activism
and progressive growth in the legislatures, it actually stripped the courts of a power
they might rightly assume to take notice of the world and adjust the law accordingly. 
Neither Freund nor Pound, then, saw the precise metonymic meanings that Lochner
would assume in the latter half of the century, but the general shape of the emerging
constitutional complaint is certainly evident in these initial commentaries.
The contours of what would become the conventional metonym came into sharper
focus in Learned Hand’s analysis of the due process question in the Harvard Law
Review.207  Through careful doctrinal argument, Hand demonstrated that the majority
198 See BICKEL, supra note 122, at 111–98 (discussing the “passive virtues” of judicial
restraint and arguing that the Court should refrain from deciding broad constitutional issues).
199 Freund, supra note 194, at 414.
200 Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 454–57 (1909).
201 Id. at 460–66 (reviewing cases).
202 Id. at 457–58.
203 Id. at 457.
204 Id. at 462.
205 Id. at 463.
206 Id. at 464; see Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN
BAG 607 (1907).
207 Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 21 HARV. L. REV. 495
(1908).
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had abandoned the historical understanding of “due process” as the “customary or
common process of law” in favor of a conception that saw “the function of the Court
[as analogous to] the function of a court in review of the facts.”208  In other words,
the Court had positioned itself as the final arbiter of whether a liberty-limiting statute
had sufficient (or “due”) relation to a constitutionally valid purpose; and it would
overturn those laws whose infirmity was “obvious beyond peradventure.”209  This
revised due process doctrine, Hand argued, raised questions much larger than the
merits of maximum hours legislation:
Whether it be wise or not that there should be a third camera with
a final veto upon legislation with whose economic or political
expediency it totally disagrees, is a political question of the high-
est importance.  In particular it is questionable whether such a
power can endure in a democratic state, while the court retains the
irresponsibility of a life tenure, and while its decisions can be re-
versed only by the cumbersome process of a change of the federal
Constitution. . . .  [I]f the Court is to retain the absolute right to
pass in the final result on the expediency of statutes passed by the
legislature, the difficulty is inherent and in the end it may demand
some change, either in the court or in the Constitution.210
Here, then, are the seeds of the Lochner we love to hate:  a decision whose symbolic
overreach calls into doubt the very institution of judicial review.211  And they emerged
as theoretical objections in the pages of legal scholarship—some admittedly penned
by a prominent judge—because, in truth, Lochner had very little doctrinal or practical
effect over the next decade.
In those areas where union membership was strong, the ten-hour day remained
largely in force; and in other areas the Bakeshop Act had never had much purchase to
begin with.212  For its part, the Court actually upheld the majority of labor legislation
that came before it over the next decade.213  In fact, in 1914 Congress enlarged the
208 Id. at 496, 500.
209 Id. at 500.
210 Id. It is interesting to note Hand’s call for change “either in the court or in the
Constitution” in light of what would occur in 1937; undoubtedly a change in the Court, and,
some would argue, also a change in the Constitution. For a discussion of Roosevelt’s court-
packing plan and the famous “switch in time,” see ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 316–35. See
also id. at 359–60 (calling the embrace of an activist government a “doctrinal revolution”).
211 For contemporary agreement on this point, see Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 MICH. L. REV. 643, 670 (1909).
212 Tarrow, supra note 144, at 298.
213 See, e.g., Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915) (upholding hours law for female hotel
workers); Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320 (1913) (upholding child
labor law); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding hours law for female laundry
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Court’s jurisdiction over state court judgments in order to protect progressive labor
legislation from overzealous state judges.214  Writing in the Harvard Law Review in
1916, Felix Frankfurter concluded that, “the groundwork of the Lochner case has by
this time been cut from under. . . . [T]he fundamental constitutional doctrine of the
assumption of rightness of legislative conduct, where the court is uninformed, is again
rigorously being enforced.”215  And in 1917 Lochner itself seemed to fall by implica-
tion in Bunting v. Oregon when the Court—amidst a flurry of pro-labor decisions216—
upheld a ten-hour workday for workers “employed in any mill, factory or manufac-
turing establishment.”217  But the judicial tide would turn swiftly and dramatically in
1920 with the election of Warren Harding, an event that would have profound conse-
quences for both due process doctrine and the Court itself.
Death and old age conspired to give Harding four Supreme Court appointments
in his shortened presidential term, and he took full advantage of the opportunity to
reshape the constitutional debate on economic regulation.218  Harding’s appointments
(Taft, Sutherland, Butler, and Sanford) immediately tilted the balance of the Court
back in favor of the liberty of contract,219 and it was over the next decade and a half that
the “Lochner Era” truly took shape.  Perhaps most notable was the Court’s opinion
in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, which resuscitated Lochner while striking down a
minimum wage law for women and children in the District of Columbia.220  Writing
workers); Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 246 (1907) (upholding eight-hour workday for
federal employees); Wilmington Star Mining Co. v. Fulton, 205 U.S. 60 (1907) (upholding
safety regulations for mines); accord Charles Warren, The Progressiveness of the United
States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 294, 294–96 (1913).
214 An Act to amend an Act entitled “An Act to codify, revise and amend the laws relating
to the judiciary,” Pub. L. No. 63-224, 38 Stat. 790 (1914) (granting the Court the power to
review state court decisions).
215 Felix Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law, 29 HARV. L.
REV. 353, 370 (1916).
216 See Simpson v. O’Hara, 243 U.S. 629 (1917) (per curium) (upholding minimum wage
for women); Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917) (upholding eight-hour workday and mini-
mum wage for railworkers); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210 (1917) (upholding workman’s
compensation law).
217 Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 433–34 (1917); accord Henry Wolf Biklé, Judicial
Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action,
38 HARV. L. REV. 6, 12 (1924).
218 Harding appointed William Taft following the death of Edward White; Edward Sanford
after the death of Mahlon Pitney; Pierce Butler to replace the aging William Day (he lived
one more year); and George Sutherland to succeed the resigned John Clarke. See Supreme
Court Nominations, 1789–Present, United States Senate, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/
reference/nominations/reverseNominations.shtml.
219 Bernstein, supra note 117, at 1507.
220 Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). It is worth noting that, in reaction
to Adkins, Thomas Reed Powell revived the academy’s attacks on Lochner. Thomas Reed
Powell, The Judiciality of Minimum-Wage Legislation, 37 HARV. L. REV. 545, 555–58 (1923)
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for the majority, Justice George Sutherland went to exaggerated lengths to emphasize
the presumption of legislative constitutionality before settling on a decisive disjunctive: 
“But if by clear and indubitable demonstration a statute be opposed to the Constitution
we have no choice but to say so.”221  And in marshalling cases against the contested
law he quoted liberally from Peckham’s opinion in Lochner, conceding only that
“[s]ubsequent cases in this Court have been distinguished from that decision, but the
principles therein stated have never been disapproved.”222  In dissent, Chief Justice
William Howard Taft questioned Lochner’s doctrinal viability after Bunting:  “The
law [upheld in Bunting] covered the whole field of industrial employment and cer-
tainly covered the case of persons employed in bakeries. . . .  It is [thus] impossible
for me to reconcile the Bunting Case and the Lochner Case and I have always sup-
posed that the Lochner Case was thus overruled sub silentio.”223  But, even if Bunting
had repudiated Lochner, Adkins now turned the tables again, as Sutherland returned
the liberty of contract to constitutional glory in high rhetorical style:
To sustain the individual freedom of action contemplated by the
Constitution, is not to strike down the common good but to exalt
it; for surely the good of society as a whole cannot be better served
than by the preservation against arbitrary restraint of the liberties
of its constituent members.224
Over the next ten years the Court would hand down several of its more infamous
Lochner Era decisions, although on close inspection it is difficult to come up with
the “nearly 200” total era cases later scholars would claim.225  Among the better known
are Jay Burns Baking  Co. v. Bryan, which struck down a law regulating the weight
of saleable bread loaves,226 and Weaver v. Palmer Brothers Co., which invalidated
a prohibition on the use of “shoddy” as upholstery stuffing.227  The Justices also nar-
rowed or closely cabined existing exceptions to the doctrine, such as the exemption
(arguing that the decision “represents [the] personal views of desirable government policy,”
rather that constitutional analysis).
221 Adkins, 261 U.S. at 544.
222 Id. at 548–50.
223 Id. at 563–64 (Taft, J., dissenting).
224 Id. at 561 (majority opinion).
225 See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 445 (12th ed. 1991); LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 567 & n.2 (2d ed. 1988). The number 200 (between
1890 and 1937) probably derives from Felix Frankfurter’s compilation of 220 decisions. See
FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT app. 1 (1938). For a
thorough breakdown of these cases positing a much lower number of actual due process deci-
sions, see MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS, THE LOCHNER COURT, MYTH AND REALITY: SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS FROM THE 1890S TO THE 1930S, at 34–40 (2001).
226 Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924).
227 Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co. 270 U.S. 402 (1926).
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for businesses “affected with a public interest,”228 and—perhaps most notably for
future generations—began to expand substantive due process analysis to include new
kinds of fundamental rights.  In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court struck down a pro-
hibition on German language teaching, and Justice James McReynolds gave broad
texture to an evolving list of Fourteenth Amendment liberties.229  In many ways it
is Meyer—and other “civil liberty” cases like it230—that would become the fulcrum
of later debates about Lochner’s metonymic meaning, as commentators tried either to
distinguish or conflate “good” (civil liberty) and “bad” (economic liberty) Lochnering.231 
The financial crash of 1929 and ensuing depression, however, drew the nation’s focus
ineluctably to economic issues, and the Court’s continuing efforts to preserve liber-
tarian values and the laissez-faire market became politically untenable.232
The history of the Court’s battle with Congress and the Executive between 1930
and 1937 is well documented, and I will not rehearse it here except to say that, as is
true of many such narratives, the constitutional canon that began to emerge from the
“switch in time that saved nine” was something akin to winner’s history.233  Two
decisions handed down in 1938 struck at the very core of the old economic jurispru-
dence.  United States v. Carolene Products fundamentally reoriented the relationship
between Congress and the Court such that the Justices would now presume economic
regulations rested “upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience
of the legislators.”234  And the foundations of “mechanical jurisprudence”—Pound’s
bugaboo—began to crumble in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,235 which ended the Court’s
longstanding efforts to “constitutionalize the categories of the common law.”236 
228 Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indust. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 535–36 (1923).
229 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). These liberties included:
[T]he right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates
of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recog-
nized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men.
Id. at 399.
230 See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 361 (1931) (invalidating prohibition
on display of a red flag “as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government”);
Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927) (invalidating prohibition of Japanese schools);
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating prohibition of private schools).
231 See infra text accompanying footnotes 250–83.
232 Bernstein, supra note 117, at 1510.
233 The phrase is Thomas Reed Powell’s sardonic description of Justice Owen Roberts’s
doctrinal about-face in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), which defused
President Roosevelt’s court packing plan. See FISS, supra note 114, at 8 n.30.
234 United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). In his fourth footnote,
Justice Harlan Stone laid the groundwork for a more active scrutiny of statutes infringing on
certain civil liberties. Id. at 153 n.4.
235 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
236 ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 370.
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Finally, in 1941—just three days after Justice McReynolds (the last of the famed “four
horseman”) retired237—the new Court drove a definitive stake through the heart of
the old doctrine with its unanimous opinion in United States v. Darby.238  But, even
with the death of its era, Lochner itself did not take on particular metonymic signifi-
cance for several decades—and when the notoriety did come it was, again, begun in
the academy.239
Perhaps predictably, academic interest in Lochner began to pick up in the late
1960s and early 1970s, as the Warren Court reinvigorated substantive due process
in cases like Griswold v. Connecticut240—which explicitly “reaffirm[ed] the principle”
of Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters—and Roe v. Wade.241  While
the 1965 edition of Gerald Gunther’s widely used constitutional law textbook skipped
right past Lochner and its progeny (going straight from the Slaughterhouse Cases
to Palko v. Connecticut),242 by 1970 Gunther had put together a new section entitled
“Substantive Due Process and Economic Regulation:  The Rise of Judicial Interven-
tion,” in which he coined, or at least popularized, the phrase “Lochner Era.”243  By 1975,
developments merited an entire chapter—109 pages in length—entitled “Substantive
Due Process:  Rise, Decline, Revival,” with a lengthy section devoted to Lochner.244 
In the introduction, Gunther explained a need “to contrast more sharply the dis-
credited use of [substantive due process] doctrine in an earlier era with its modern
revival in the contraception and abortion decisions,”245 though he later confided to
Randy Barnett that he had juxtaposed Lochner with the Warren Court cases in an
effort to discredit the modern decisions.246  Meanwhile, Robert Bork reached back
to Lochner, Meyer, Pierce, and Adkins as part of a scathing attack on Griswold, in
which he argued that substantive due process “is and always has been an improper
237 Id. at 373.
238 312 U.S. 100, 125 (1941) (“[I]t is no longer open to question that the fixing of a mini-
mum wage is within the legislative power. . . . Nor is it any longer open to question that it is
within the legislative power to fix maximum hours.”).
239 See Bernstein, supra note 117, at 1511 (noting that Lochner was cited primarily for
Holmes’s dissent, and that, when it was discussed, it was “lumped . . . in with other cases
invalidating economic regulations”).
240 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (overturning Connecticut statute forbidding use of contraceptives).
241 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating Texas law criminalizing abortion).
242 NOEL T. DOWLING & GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 722–25(7th ed. 1965).
243 GERALD GUNTHER & NOEL T. DOWLING, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 954, 963 (8th ed. 1970). Professor David Bernstein has undertaken a fascinating review
of Lochner’s evolving treatment in popular textbooks during this period. See Bernstein, supra
note 117, at 1518 n.317.
244 GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 548–656 (9th
ed. 1975).
245 Id. at xx.
246 Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2003
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 31 & n.32; accord Bernstein, supra note 117, at 1520.
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doctrine . . . requir[ing] the Court to say, without guidance from the Constitution,
which liberties or gratifications may be infringed by majorities and which may not.”247 
And in a highly visible essay in the Yale Law Journal, John Hart Ely compared Roe
to Lochner, emphasizing the latter’s disrepute:  “The Court continues to disavow the
philosophy of Lochner.  Yet . . . it is impossible candidly to regard Roe as the product
of anything else.”248  Indeed, Ely suggested that over the long term Roe might actu-
ally be more “dangerous” than Lochner, in that the modern Court held that abortion
laws impinged a fundamental or “special” right and were thus subject to heightened
judicial scrutiny—greater constitutional protection than was ever afforded the liberty
of contract.249
On reflection, it is probably unsurprising that it took a change in constitutional
culture—the revival of substantive due process—to bring Lochner to the fore as an
anti-canonical metonym; after all what is argumentative metonymy without an argu-
ment?  But once kindled, Lochner’s prominence within constitutional practice grew
rapidly.  The real “tipping point,” David Bernstein argues, came with the publication
of Laurence Tribe’s American Constitutional Law in 1978.250  Tribe—probably our
most learned living doctrinalist—famously broke constitutional analysis down into
seven “models,”251 and hailed Lochner and its era as the high water mark of the second
category:  “the model of implied limitations on government.”252  As Bernstein points
out, throughout a twenty-eight page chapter Tribe “consistently us[ed] ‘Lochner’ as
shorthand for all of the Supreme Court’s liberty of contract jurisprudence,”253 and the
case name itself appears in four of the seven section titles.254  But—unlike Gunther,
Bork, and Ely before him—Tribe did not analogize the Warren Court to the Lochner
Era; instead he worked to distinguish the modern substantive due process revival from
its dishonored roots.255  Indeed, he found no fault in the Lochner Court’s willingness
to thwart the will of the majority—“surely there can be no general duty on the part of
a deliberately countermajoritarian body like a court . . . simply to follow the election
returns”—arguing rather that the Court’s mistake was “overconfidence” in “its own
factual notions,” and in failing to recognize “that the economic ‘freedom’ it was
protecting was more myth than reality.”256  As such, Tribe’s treatment was the first
247 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1, 11 (1971).
248 John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 939 (1973).
249 Id. at 940–43.
250 Bernstein, supra note 117, at 1518, 1520.
251 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1.1, at 1 (2d ed. 1988).
252 Id. §§ 8.1–8.7.
253 Bernstein, supra note 117, at 1520.
254 TRIBE, supra note 251, at §§ 8.2, 8.5–7.
255 See id. § 15.6, at 1318 (declaring the “durability” of Meyer and Pierce, despite their
Lochner Era heritage).
256 Id. § 8.7, at 586.
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significant academic effort to recalibrate Lochner’s conventional metonymic meaning: 
by his account the epithet should not apply to all judicial interference with the legisla-
tive prerogative, only to economic activism or other “pigheaded” judicial encroach-
ments.257  It is here that we see the process of canonical refinement take center stage,
as the older progressive Lochner metonym collided with new judicial culture of civil
and social justice.
Bernstein contends that, after Tribe’s treatise, use of the term “Lochner Era” in
academic discourse “skyrocketed,”258 and my own search of the electronic databases
largely confirms his assessment.259  But to attribute this circumstance too completely
to Tribe’s book is probably to underestimate the Court’s own role in fueling Lochner’s
growing notoriety.  In 1977—a year before Tribe—the Court itself used Gunther’s
“Lochner Era” terminology for the first time in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
which struck down an ordinance that defined a “family” narrowly for housing pur-
poses.260  And notably, Justice Lewis Powell’s plurality opinion took very much the
same view of Lochner’s legacy as would Tribe:
Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for
this Court.  There are risks when the judicial branch gives en-
hanced protection to certain substantive liberties without the
guidance of the more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. 
As the history of the Lochner era demonstrates, there is reason
for concern lest the only limits to such judicial intervention become
the predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members
of this Court.  That history counsels caution and restraint.  But it
does not counsel abandonment.261
Rather, Powell urged continuing due process recognition for what the latter Justice
John Marshall Harlan had called “the traditions from which [our nation] developed
as well as the traditions from which it broke,” and suggested that Meyer and Pierce—
but not Lochner—met the relevant criteria.262  So it seems that the Court, too, was
working to refine Lochner’s meaning in an effort to distinguish between good and
bad “Lochnering.”  And, with this in mind, it was undoubtedly some combination
257 Id.
258 Bernstein, supra note 117, at 1521.
259 A search of Hein-On-Line’s “Most Cited Law Reviews” database for the phrase “Lochner
Era” returns zero articles for the ten years preceding Gerald Gunther’s 1970 edition; thirty-
four articles between 1970 and 1978, when Tribe’s treatise appeared; and 292 articles over
the following ten years.
260 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977). The ordinance forbid a woman from housing her son and
her two grandsons, who were “first cousins rather than brothers.” Id. at 496.
261 Id. at 502.
262 Id. at 501 & n.8 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542–43 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
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of influence and interplay between the academy and the bench that brought the anti-
canonical metonym into the modern constitutional era—but subsequent evolutions
in Lochner’s meaning would take place largely in the academy.263
In the twelve years following Moore just seventeen Federal Court opinions—
and only one Supreme Court opinion—used the phrase “Lochner Era,” and none gave
the words any thought or meaning beyond the conventional association with judicial
overreach.264  During the same period, however, discussion of Lochner exploded in
the legal journals.265  The debate stretched into the next decade, with conservatives
continuing to cast the decision as the poisonous root of the resurgent substantive
due process tree,266 and liberals building upon Tribe’s efforts to refine the metonym
and defend the Warren Court.267  On one side, Antonin Scalia continued to attack Roe
by association, calling it “the most controversial recent extension” of Lochnerian
jurisprudence,268 while, on the other, John Hart Ely distinguished between Lochner’s
illegitimate exaltation of economic rights and the Warren Court’s heroic efforts to
protect the sort of Meiklejohnian, democracy-promoting rights described in Carolene
Products’ fourth footnote.269  Writing shortly after his failed nomination to the Supreme
Court,270 an embittered Robert Bork continued to counsel the dangers of any unenu-
merated due process right—whether it be the liberty of contract or the right of privacy: 
“When the Constitution has not spoken, the Court will be able to find no scale, other
than its own value preferences, upon which to weigh the competing claims.”271  Cass
Sunstein, on the other hand, tried valiantly to recast Lochner’s metonymic meaning
in the mechanical jurisprudence tradition, as symbolic of the need for government
neutrality and inaction within perceived “natural” constructs, like the market.272 
Understood this way, Sunstein argued that Lochner’s “heirs are not Roe v. Wade
and Miranda v. Arizona, but instead such decisions as Washington v. Davis [and]
263 Again, though, it is probably too simplistic to leave the Court entirely out of this dis-
cussion. See, for example, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s interesting discussion of Lochner
and stare decisis in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861–62 (1992).
264 This figure is based on a Westlaw search of federal court opinions rendered between
1978 and 1990.
265 See supra note 259.
266 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW (1990); Antonin Scalia, Economic Affairs as Human Affairs, 4 CATO J. 703 (1985).
267 See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 114, at 99–103; JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73 (1980); FISS, supra note 114, at 390–93.
268 Scalia, supra note 266, at 705.
269 ELY, supra note 267, at 73–77.
270 See ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 394–95.
271 BORK, supra note 266, at 257.
272 Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987). One might
even plausibly include Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007) on a list meeting this criteria. In Parents Involved, the Court overturned a Seattle school
district policy that assigned students to schools based on race in an effort to achieve diversity.
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Buckley v. Valeo.”273  Others, like Bruce Ackerman, challenged the very assumption
that Lochner was wrongly decided, and argued that its modern infamy simply reflects
the dramatic changes in constitutional meanings that have occurred since 1905.274 
Indeed, the literature on Lochner’s legacy grew so large that it began to inspire its own
literature, to which this discussion is itself, I suppose, a belated addition.275
As evidence of this trend, the past decade has seen the publication of such recen-
sionist titles as Gary Rowe’s Lochner Revisionism Revisited;276 David Bernstein’s
Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy and Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised;277 Jack Balkin’s
“Wrong the Day it was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism;278 and
Howard Gillman’s De-Lochnerizing Lochner.279  All of this, I suggest, is a compelling
demonstration of our continuing efforts to distill constitutional meaning and reclaim
constitutional high ground along the shifting riverbed of constitutional practice.  While
sometimes such efforts—such as those targeting Jefferson’s wall of separation—aim
simply to chip away at a hard spot in the bank with the hope of casting it back into the
moving stream, at other times we endeavor to preserve the induration, but want to re-
shape it slightly so that it channels the constitutional water in a different direction.  The
debate surrounding Lochner belongs to the latter category, as the participants (for the
most part) agree that Lochnering is a constitutional sin, but now fight over exactly what
the sin entails.  As a result, while Lochner itself was doctrinally repudiated in 1937
(if not before)—and vilified in nearly all other respects by 1975—in 2003, as esteemed
a scholar as David Strauss could credibly ask why the case was wrongly decided.280
For all these reasons, I suggest that Lochner is an excellent example of an anti-
canonical text employed as an argumentative metonym.  It is a decision that—due in
large part to a concise and powerful dissent—has taken on associated meanings be-
yond its literal text, and our constitutional practice has refined those meanings over
time to align with the changing culture of constitutional progressivism.  When the
Court stood in the way of progressive change, Lochnering became a high crime; but
later, as the Court took the lead in social reform, the elements of the crime required
updating.  Interestingly, Lochner also provides a compelling demonstration of the
273 Sunstein, supra note 272, at 875.
274 ACKERMAN, supra note 114, at 99–103.
275 I am somehow reminded here of Hannah Arendt’s ironical appraisal of Franz Kafka’s
legacy: “Though during his lifetime he could not make a decent living, he will now keep gen-
erations of intellectuals both gainfully employed and well-fed.” Letter from Hannah Arendt to
Salman Schocken (Aug. 9, 1946), quoted in FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL xi–xii (Breon Mitchell
trans., Schocken Books 1998) (1925).
276 Gary Rowe, Lochner Revisionism Revised, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 221 (1999).
277 David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2003); David E.
Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights
Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1 (2003).
278 Balkin & Levinson, supra note 2.
279 Howard Gillman, De-Lochnerizing Lochner, 85 B.U. L. REV. 859 (2005).
280 Strauss, supra note 116, at 373.
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legal academy’s impact on metonymic meanings and the construction of the consti-
tutional canon—even within the doctrinal modality.  This is certainly not always, nor
even usually, the case, as quite often it is the advocates and the courts that reshape
and realign doctrinal metonyms.  We need look no further than Brown v. Board of
Education281—perhaps the twentieth century’s most canonical piece of doctrine—for
a powerful illustration of such metonymic evolution accomplished at the bar.282  There
we see a case that once symbolized our national commitment to overcome the worst
traditions of cultural segregation and racist iniquity refined to represent the kind of
“colorblindness” that could invalidate a school enrollment program intended to pro-
mote racial integration.283  But Lochner is evidence that the academy—and, in truth,
many spheres of constitutional discourse—can also have a profound impact on the
constitutional canon and constitutional meanings.  Indeed, the final section explores
the evolution of metonymic associations within the most inclusive and proletarian
of constitutional modalities:  ethos.
III. ETHOS:  CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE,
THE GETTYSBURG ADDRESS, AND CANONICAL REFORMATION
In the early 1960s, the Supreme Court struggled mightily with issues of legislative
malapportionment as a number of outmoded state districting schemes created significant
disparities in electoral influence.284  In a 1963 case arising out of Georgia, the Court held
that the Constitution requires states to count rural and urban votes equally, and justi-
fied that position by reference to, among other texts, the Declaration of Independence
and Abraham Lincoln’s dedication of a national cemetery at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania: 
“The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s
Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can
mean only one thing—one person, one vote.”285  The following year, in Reynolds v.
Sims—which remains among the most important and controversial cases decided last
century—the Court gave pride of place to this same language as it carried forward
a constitutional argument about the applied meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.286 
281 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
282 See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1242 (1993) (“No
one questions Brown’s result (anymore). Indeed, so completely has the legal system reoriented
itself after the decision that it may not even be possible to find the legal material with which
to mount a serious challenge to its conclusion.”).
283 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
284 In 1964, in Vermont, for example, the smallest legislative district was made up of 36
people, while the largest consisted roughly 35,000. Thus, individuals in the smaller county
enjoyed nearly a thousand-fold representative advantage. Morris K. Udall, CONGRESSMAN’S
REPORT, Reapportionment-I: “One Man, One Vote” . . . That’s All She Wrote, at 3 (Oct. 14,
1964), available at http://www.library.arizona.edu/exhibits/udall/congrept/88th/641014.html.
285 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
286 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964).
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But, as every first-year law student learns, neither the Declaration of Independence nor
the Gettysburg Address have any binding legal force, so what can these texts possibly
tell us about the legitimacy of a constitutional proposition?  The answer is, in a word,
ethos.  These are canonical statements of the ethos of American constitutionalism and
democracy, and their appearance is perfectly appropriate within the ethical modality of
constitutional argument.287  Even ethos, however, is susceptible to change and evolution,
and this is true of the most canonical texts in the modality.  This section examines the
Declaration of Independence’s metonymic odyssey through constitutional argument
over the first century of American life.  In particular, I explore the Declaration’s canon-
ical reformation in the political crucible of the Civil War, culminating in Lincoln’s
dramatic universalization of natural rights at Gettysburg.  Again, however, I begin
with a description of the Declaration’s meaning in historical context.
As he lay dying in late June of 1826, Thomas Jefferson reluctantly declined an in-
vitation from Washington to join in celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of American
independence:
I should, indeed, with peculiar delight, have met and exchanged
there, congratulations personally, with the small band, the rem-
nant of that host of worthies, who joined with us on that day, in
the bold and doubtful election we were to make for our country,
between submission, or the sword; and to have enjoyed with them
the consolatory fact, that our fellow citizens, after half a century
of experience and prosperity, continue to approve the choice we
made.  May it be to the world, what I believe it will be (to some
parts sooner, to others later, but finally to all), the signal of arous-
ing men to burst the chains under which monkish ignorance and
superstition had persuaded them to bind themselves, and to assume
the blessings and security of self-government.288
Even in his last hours, then, Jefferson showed flashes of the “masterly Pen” that
John Adams had a half-century before recommended to draft the Declaration of
Independence.289  And, in one of the great synchronicities of American mythology,
287 Indeed, the Declaration of Independence had made an appearance in 169 Supreme Court
opinions—including many of the most famous and controversial—through the 2009 Term
(count based on THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: ORIGINS AND IMPACT 303–14 app. 9.1
(Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 2002) [hereinafter ORIGINS AND IMPACT] and a search of Westlaw’s
Supreme Court database for the years 2001–2009). For a thorough account of the ethical
modality, see BOBBITT, supra note 9, at 93–119.
288 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Roger Weightman, (June 24, 1826),  in THE LIFE AND
SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 665–66 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds.,
Modern Library Paperback Edition, 1998) (1944).
289 3 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 335 (L.H. Butterfield et al. eds.,
Atheneum 1964) (1961).
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both men—their lives inextricably entwined from the summer of 1776 onward—
would die on the very day of the Declaration’s fiftieth anniversary.  Here, at the end,
it seems Jefferson hoped to reinforce what he saw as the Declaration’s enduring mean-
ing; it had, he thought, “laid open to every view the palpable truth that the mass of
mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted
and spurred.”290  Yet even as he wrote, black slaves worked the halls and fields of
Monticello—many remained in bondage after his death—and the institution of slavery
stood as a stark counterfactual to American political idealism.
What, then, are we to make of the Declaration’s majestic opening lines, particu-
larly the “self-evident” assertion that “all men are created equal . . . endowed by their
creator with certain unalienable rights”?291  Did Jefferson, or the Continental Congress,
really mean all men?  The Declaration is, of course, more than just its soaring pre-
amble, but it is this specific question—the metonymic meaning of Jefferson’s most
famous phrase—that this section explores.  The answer, of course, is complex and
controverted, but I begin my account with Jefferson himself in the hope of under-
standing what the enigmatic Virginian understood his words to mean.  I then look at
the Congress that debated and issued the Declaration, before finally investigating the
argumentative uses to which these words were put in the next eighty-seven years of
constitutional and political discourse.  I conclude that the phrase came to have two
meanings:  the first aspirational and the second functional; and that it was only through
the political calamity of war, made human in the person of Abraham Lincoln, that
the two were finally fused.
In considering Jefferson’s personal intentions, it may be useful to begin by exam-
ining some of the sources from which he drew intellectual inspiration.  Jefferson
claimed that he “turned to neither book or pamphlet” when composing his initial draft
of the Declaration292—indeed, Adams would later describe the opening sentiments
as commonplace and “hackneyed in Congress for two years before”293—but we can
certainly deduce some of the works that helped shape the preamble.  Chief among these
must be the first section of George Mason’s Virginia Declaration of Rights, which
began by asserting “that all men are by nature equally free and independent and have
certain inherent rights.”294  Mason’s work formed part of the Virginia Constitution
290 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Roger Weightman, supra note 288. Here, Jefferson
undoubtedly paraphrased English Colonel Richard Rumbold’s famous last words from the
scaffold. See Douglass Adair, Rumbold’s Dying Speech, 1685, and Jefferson’s Last Words
on Democracy, 1826, 9 WM. & MARY Q. 521, 525–26 (1952).
291 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
292 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 30, 1823) in THOMAS JEFFERSON
PAPERS, supra note 32 (follow “Series” hyperlink; then follow “Series 1. General Corre-
spondence. 1651–1827” hyperlink; then follow “September 18, 1823” hyperlink; type  1157
and then follow “Turn to Image”).
293 Letter from John Adams to Timothy Pickering (Aug. 6, 1822), in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 512, 514 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1850).
294 George Mason, Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), reprinted in FOUNDING THE
REPUBLIC: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 52 (John J. Patrick ed., 1995). For a thorough account
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of 1776, which Jefferson himself helped draft, and he regarded Mason as the “wisest
man of his generation.”295  Further, the Pennsylvania Gazette reprinted the Virginia
Declaration in Philadelphia on June 12, 1776—right around the time Jefferson was
writing.296  Mason, in turn, undoubtedly drew on John Locke’s Second Treatise of
Civil Government, in which the British philosopher claimed “that all men by nature
are equal,” and “that equal right that every man has to his natural freedom.”297  Indeed,
Jefferson would later acknowledge his debt to “the elementary books of public right,
[such] as Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, [and] Sidney” as well as to the “harmonizing senti-
ments of the day.”298  The Philadelphia air, it seems, was thick with talk of natural law
and equality.
The salient question here, of course, is whether Jefferson’s reliance on this spirit
and these sources can tell us anything meaningful about his intention to include black
slaves within the Declaration’s opening ambit.  While it is true, and perhaps interest-
ing, that Aristotle, Cicero, Mason, (and perhaps Locke and Sidney299) all lived in slave-
holding societies, this is hardly evidence of their views on the practice as a matter
of political theory.  Mason, though he owned a large number of slaves, openly de-
nounced the institution,300 while Aristotle plainly believed some people were born
to serve.301  Locke thought contractual slavery was against the law of nature, but he
believed that the practice might appropriately exist “between a lawful conqueror and
of Mason’s influence on Jefferson’s draft, see R. Carter Pittman, The Declaration of
Independence: Its Antecedents and Authors (1953), available at http://rcarterpittman.org/
essays/documents/Declaration_of_Independence.html.
295 1 KATE M. ROWLAND, THE LIFE OF GEORGE MASON 1725–1792, ix (1892).
296 Williamsburg, PA GAZETTE, June 12, 1776, at 2.
297 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, ch. 6, at § 54 (Thomas
P. Peardon ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1952) (1690).
298 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee (May 8, 1825), in THE LIFE AND SELECTED
WRITINGS, supra note 288, at 656–57. Robert Pittman disputes this claim, arguing that Jefferson
relied heavily on William Henry Drayton’s preamble to the South Carolina Constitution of
1776 and a grand jury charge he issued as Chief Justice the same year. See Pittman, supra
note 294.
299 The feudal forms largely replaced outright slavery in England by the end of the thirteenth
century, see CHARLES ARNOLD-BAKER, THE COMPANION TO BRITISH HISTORY 1145 (2d ed.
2001), but during Sidney and Locke’s time some African slaves were brought to the island until
the practice was essentially ended with Lord Mansfield’s opinion in Somerset’s Case, 98 Eng.
Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772), reprinted in William M. Wiecek, Somerset: Lord Mansfield and the
Legitimacy of Slavery in The Anglo-American World, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 86, 86–87 (1974).
300 See George Mason, Annotations to the Virginia Charters, No. 1621 § 3, reprinted in
1 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 173 & n.7 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1970) (“[Slavery is] that
slow Poison, which is daily contaminating the Minds & Morals of our People. Every Gentlemen
here is born a petty Tyrant.”).
301 See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, ch. 5 § 20, in 9 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 447
(Benjamin Jowett trans., W.D. Ross ed., 1952) (“For that some should rule and others be ruled
is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth some are marked out
for subjection, others for rule.”).
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his captive”302 when slaves “taken in a just war, are by the right of nature subjected
to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters.”303  Sidney had some
contradictory things to say on the topic, but he did proclaim that there exists “no such
thing in nature as a slave.”304  Cicero, for his part, both owned slaves and thought of
the institution in very Aristotelian terms:  “[W]hen those are slaves who cannot gov-
ern themselves, there is no injury done.”305  On balance, these considerations might
suggest that Jefferson accepted slavery as a necessary exception to—or perhaps even
an essential part of—natural law political theory.  But Jefferson’s mere familiarity
with philosophical justifications, of course, proves very little about his personal thoughts
on the American institution and its place in the Declaration’s embodied political
ideology.  If anything, we might reasonably conclude that Jefferson’s own convic-
tions were closest to Mason’s, for whom he had great affinity.  Indeed, more com-
pelling evidence suggests that slavery was very much on his mind in Philadelphia, and
that he thought the slave trade, at least, anathema to the natural order.
Jefferson’s original draft of the Declaration included among its list of grievances
against George III the charge that:
[H]e has waged cruel war against human nature itself, violating
its most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a dis-
tant people who never offended him, captivating [and] carrying
them into slavery in another hemisphere or to incur miserable
death in their transportation thither. [T]his piratical warfare, the
opprobrium of infidel powers, is the warfare of the Christian
king of Great Britain. [D]etermined to keep open a market where
Men should be bought [and] sold, he has prostituted his negative
for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or to restrain
this execrable commerce. [A]nd that this assemblage of horrors
might want no fact of distinguished die, he is now exciting those
very people to rise in arms among us, and to purchase that liberty
of which he has deprived them, by murdering the people on whom
he has also obtruded them:  thus paying off former crimes com-
mitted against the Liberties of one people, with crimes which he
urges them to commit against the lives of another.306
302 LOCKE, supra note 297, at 14–16. Locke thought it impossible to contract away one’s
life and liberty, which belonged naturally to God. Id.
303 Id. at 42.
304 ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT (Joseph Cellini ed., Arno
Press 1979) (1698).
305 CICERO, DE REPUBLICA, bk. 3, ch. 25, quoted in A.J. Raymer, Slavery—The Graeco-
Roman Defence, 10 GREECE AND ROME 17, 19 (1940). The quoted language is derived from
fragmentary sources. For a more thorough treatment of Cicero’s thoughts on the issue, see
CICERO, THE REPUBLIC AND THE LAWS, bk. 3, ch. 37A.
306 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the Proceedings in Congress June 7–August 1, 1776, in
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This language, later struck in Congress, is certainly consistent with Jefferson’s more
general thoughts on slavery as an institution.  In his Notes on the State of Virginia,
written just a few years later, Jefferson lamented the destructive effects on both master
and subject of “a perpetual exercise of the most . . . unremitting despotism on the one
part, and degrading submissions on the other.”307  And, as a matter of political theory,
he clearly thought the practice a violation of natural law:  “[C]an the liberties of a
nation be thought secure when we have removed their only firm basis, a conviction
in the minds of the people that these liberties are of the gift of God?”308  From this evi-
dence, then, it would seem Jefferson did not share the Aristotelian view of a natural
condition of slavery.
Yet there is other language in the Notes that has led some historians to argue that
Jefferson did not view black men as nearly the equal of whites.309  In a long passage
exploring a proposal to abolish slavery in Virginia and recolonize blacks elsewhere,
he discussed the relative merits of the races, and, in general, seemed to find blacks
inferior.310  In particular, he thought little of the black intellect:  “[I]n reason [blacks
are] much inferior, as I think one could scarcely be found capable of tracing and com-
prehending the investigations of Euclid; and . . . in imagination they are dull, tasteless
and anomalous.”311  He attributed some of these shortcomings to the oppressions of
slavery, but overall he concluded that “their inferiority is not the effect merely of their
condition of life.”312  But his judgments were not entirely disparaging, and in par-
ticular he believed that “in [endowments] of the heart [Nature] will be found to have
done them justice.”313  While this may seem a hollow concession to the modern reader,
Garry Wills insightfully argues that, given Jefferson’s grounding in Scottish common
sense philosophy, we should understand his reference to the “heart” as real praise
for blacks’ ability to feel and act upon the moral sentiments:  “[W]hen Jefferson says
that blacks are equal to whites in ‘benevolence, gratitude, and unshaken fidelity,’ he
is listing the cardinal virtues of moral-sense theory, the central manifestations of
man’s highest faculty.”314  Thus, Wills contends that Jefferson actually judged the
1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1760–1776, at 317–18 [hereinafter JEFFERSON PAPERS]
(Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950) (emphasis original).
307 JEFFERSON, supra note 23, at 162.
308 Id. at 163.
309 See, e.g., PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE
AGE OF JEFFERSON 191 (2d ed. 2001) (arguing that Jefferson’s views on race “are quite clear
and utterly in conflict with the ‘liberal Jefferson’ his biographers have tried to create”);
LEONARD LEVY, JEFFERSON & CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE (1963) (examining the
“lesser known or ‘darker side’” of Thomas Jefferson).
310 JEFFERSON, NOTES, supra note 23, at 148–56.
311 Id. at 150–51.
312 Id. at 152.
313 Id. at 154.
314 GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON’S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
225–26 (1978).
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races literally equal in the most deeply significant way:  “For him, accidental differ-
ences of body or mind were dwarfed by an all-important equality in the governing
faculty of man.”315  And, it was this faculty above all others that gave blacks an equal
claim, in Jefferson’s mind, to the natural rights of mankind.316
On balance, then, I think it is safe to conclude that Jefferson did intend to include
blacks within the scope of the Declaration’s sweeping statement of equality.  Both
his polemic against the King’s support of the slave trade and his broader disapproba-
tion for the American practice suggest that he saw no place for the institution in a just
political theory.  Even his explicit assertions of racial inferiority—no matter how jar-
ring they may be to modern ears—hardly demonstrate that Jefferson believed blacks
had a lesser claim to equality at law.  Rather, he thought that equal possession of the
moral senses gave blacks every right to equal standing before the law.  And certainly
he was not alone in these beliefs among the Declaration’s signers—John Adams and
James Wilson spring instantly to mind317—but, just as certainly, he knew that not all
members of the Continental Congress shared his views.  Indeed, it is in turning our
attention to the Congress that issued the Declaration that we can begin to make out
the Preamble’s divergent aspirational and functional meanings.
As instructive as the original condemnation of the slave trade is in assessing
Jefferson’s intentions when drafting the Declaration, the decision to omit the impas-
sioned language from the final document reveals even more about Congress’s under-
standing of the lofty exordium.  Unfortunately, there is little primary record of the
debates in Congress over the Declaration’s final language, though a comparison of
Jefferson’s original draft (or at least the copy he gave to John Adams beforehand) and
the ratified version shows a number of significant alterations.318  While it is clear that
some of these occurred within the drafting committee—which consisted of Jefferson,
Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Roger Sherman, and Robert Livingston—the grievance
against the slave trade was removed in Congress.319  The best contemporary descrip-
tions of the Congressional debates are Jefferson’s own Notes on the Proceedings in
Congress, which he seems to have taken during the summer of 1776, and then sent
in refined form to James Madison in 1783.320  Of the passage on slavery, he wrote
the following:
315 Id. at 228.
316 Id.
317 See, e.g., Letter from John Adams to George Churchman & Jacob Lindley (Jan. 24,
1801), in 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 293, at 92–93; James Wilson, Address
to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 3, 1787), reprinted in 2 DEBATES ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 99, at 451–53.
318 For a full discussion of the numerous drafts and the timing and impetus of various
changes, see Gerard W. Gawalt, Drafting the Declaration, in THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE, ORIGINS AND IMPACT 1, 4–7 (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 2002).
319 Id. at 10.
320 Id. at 5.
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The clause too, reprobating the enslaving the inhabitants of Africa,
was struck out in complaisance to South Carolina [and] Georgia,
who had never attempted to restrain the importation of slaves, and
who on the contrary still wished to continue it. [O]ur Northern
brethren also I believe felt a little tender under those censures; for
though their people have very few slaves themselves yet they had
been pretty considerable carriers of them to others.321
In truth, it was excruciating for Jefferson to see any of his language altered, but this
particular omission was among those he most regretted.322  Indeed, Virginian Richard
Henry Lee tried to soothe Jefferson by expressing his wish “for the honor of Congress,
as for that of the States, that the manuscript had not been mangled as it is.”323  But
Jefferson well understood the political realities of the colonial alliance, and the
deletion of the passage on slavery cannot have come as any great surprise; for, as he
trenchantly observed in explaining his Notes, “the sentiments of men are known not
only by what they receive, but what they reject also.”324
As the bulk of Jefferson’s account makes clear, Congress’s principal motivation
for issuing the Declaration was the hope that formal independence might make French
financial and military support possible.  Fully a third of the objections Jefferson
ascribes to Robert Livingston, Edward Rutledge, and the Pennsylvania delegation
address the perceived inefficacy of the Declaration as an enticement of foreign aid.325 
A representative criticism suggested that “foreign powers would either refuse to join
themselves to our fortunes, or having us so much in their power as that desperate
declaration would place us, they would insist on terms proportionably more hard
[and] prejudicial.”326  Conversely, John Adams and the Virginia delegation argued
that “a declaration of Independence alone could render it consistent with European
delicacy for European powers to treat with us, or even to receive an Ambassador from
us”—and, indeed, “the only misfortune is that we did not enter into an alliance with
France six months sooner.”327  With such pressing foreign policy concerns at hand, it
is understandable that Congress thought it an inopportune time to contemplate or
debate the natural law implications of black slavery.  For Congress, the Declaration
was meant to serve a pragmatic and very political function, and it did that well.  As
321 Jefferson, supra note 306, at 314–15.
322 JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 51 (1997).
Pauline Maier argues that Jefferson had intended the slavery passage “to be the emotional
climax of his case against the King.” PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 121 (1997).
323 Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Thomas Jefferson (July 21, 1776), in 1 JEFFERSON
PAPERS, supra note 306, at 471.
324 Gawalt, supra note 318, at 10.
325 Jefferson, supra note 306, at 310–11.
326 Id. at 310.
327 Id. at 312.
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Pauline Maier has observed, “By exercising their intelligence [and] political good
sense . . . the delegates managed to make the Declaration at once more accurate and
more consonant with the convictions of their constituents.”328  And certainly not all
of those constituents shared Jefferson’s aspirations for the legal equality of African
slaves.329  Thus, I think it is ultimately safe to ascribe to Congress a functional under-
standing of the Preamble’s language:  while some delegates certainly aspired to uni-
versal human equality, the assembly as a whole was content at that time to stake its
claim only to the equal rights of Englishmen.330
Returning to my descriptivist project, I think the use of the Declaration’s Preamble
as an argumentative metonym over the next seventy-five years of constitutional dis-
course provides ample evidence of its different functional and aspirational meanings. 
In the early years of the Union, the Declaration had not yet achieved the canonical status
that was to come,331 but it did make sporadic appearances in Congressional debates
on slavery—primarily to buttress aspirational kinds of arguments.  In 1789, Virginian
Josiah Parker invoked “the pure beneficence of the doctrine we hold out to the world
in our Declaration of Independence” in a failed push for a tax on slave importations.332 
The following year, New Jersey’s Elias Boudinot rose in support of a Quaker remon-
strance against slavery—which, too, failed to garner much support—quoting the lan-
guage of Jefferson’s preamble.333  And sixteen years later, as efforts got underway
to prohibit the slave trade at the first constitutional opportunity, Pennsylvanian John
Smilie appealed to “the principles of 1776, which have indeed been since laughed at,
but which are now beginning, I hope, to be held in universal estimation”; and then
read aloud Jefferson’s list of self-evident truths.334  Interestingly, however, it was in
response to Smilie that fellow Pennsylvanian Joseph Clay began explicitly to trace
the outlines of the functionalist metonym:
328 MAIER, supra note 322, at 150.
329 John Adams later conceded, “I knew [Jefferson’s] Southern brethren would never suffer
[the slavery passage] to pass in Congress.” Letter from John Adams to Timothy Pickering,
supra note 293, at 514.
330 See Philip F. Detweiler, Congressional Debate On Slavery and the Declaration of
Independence, 1819–1821, 63 AM. HIST. REV. 598, 599–600 (1958) (“[The historian] who
would contend that the phrase ‘all men’ was understood by the members of the Continental
Congress to include Negro slaves has a fragile foundation on which to build.”).
331 Philip F. Detweiler, The Changing Reputation of the Declaration of Independence:
The First Fifty Years, 19 WM. & MARY Q. 557, 564 (1962) (describing that the Declaration
of Independence “had not yet acquired the character of ‘a repository of magical and immortal
phrases that burn in the mind and sing in the heart.’”) (quoting NATHAN SCHACHNER, THOMAS
JEFFERSON: A BIOGRAPHY 129 (1951)).
332 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 337 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). For a general discussion of these
arguments—which was an invaluable resource in writing this section—see Detweiler, supra
note 330, at 600–01.
333 2 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 332, at 1469.
334 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 225–26 (Joseph Gales ed., 1852).
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The Declaration of Independence is to be taken with a great quali-
fication.  It declares those men have an inalienable right to life;
yet we hang criminals—to liberty, yet we imprison—to the pur-
suit of happiness, yet he must not infringe on the rights of others. 
If the Declaration of Independence is taken in its fullest extent,
it will warrant robbery and murder, for some may think even
those crimes necessary to their happiness.335
Clay, of course, rather missed Smilie’s point—which decried slavery as a hereditary
status—but the general thrust of his argument for a “qualifi[ed]” understanding of
the preamble would take center stage in 1819, as slavery dominated the debate over
Missouri’s admission to the Union.
The controversy began in February of 1819, when New York Representative
James Tallmadge moved to amend a pending bill on Missouri’s admission “to limit
the existence of slavery in the new State, by declaring all free who should be born
in the Territory after its admission into the Union.”336  The constitutional question
Tallmadge’s amendment posed—whether Congress had the power to condition admis-
sion upon a restriction of slavery—admitted no ready textual, historical, or doctrinal
answer, and so several delegates turned to ethical argument and invoked the Declaration
as “an authority admitted in all parts of the Union [as] a definition of the basis of re-
publican government.”337  With this in mind Massachusetts’ Timothy Fuller sug-
gested that, by the light of the Preamble, a slaveholding Missouri could not satisfy
the Constitution’s Republican Government Clause, as “it cannot be denied that slaves
are men, it follows that they are in a purely republican government born free, and are
entitled to liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”338  Several Southern delegates imme-
diately objected that such an interpretation would call into question “the republican
character of the slaveholding States,”339 and Fuller’s response clearly delineates the
Declaration’s functional and aspirational meanings in constitutional law:
The predominant principle . . . is []that all men are free, and
have an equal right to liberty, and all other privileges; or, in other
words, the predominant principle is republicanism, in its largest
sense.  But, then, the same compact contains certain exceptions. 
The States then holding slaves are permitted, from the necessity
335 Id. at 227.
336 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 1166 (Joseph Gales ed., 1855). For a comprehensive account of
the Missouri controversy, see GLOVER MOORE, THE MISSOURI CONTROVERSY 1819–1821
(1953); accord Detweiler, supra note 330, at 602–16.
337 33 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 336, at 1181; accord Detweiler, supra note 330, at 603.
338 33 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 336, at 1180.
339 Id.
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of the case, and for the sake of union, to exclude the republican
principle so far, and only so far, as to retain their slaves in servi-
tude, and also their progeny, as had been the usage, until they
should think it proper or safe to conform to the pure principle by
abolishing slavery.340
Congress adjourned in March, and when it reconvened the following December the pro-
slavery faction had had time to develop and build upon these functionalist arguments.341
Maryland Senator William Pinkney, for example, expressed the view that, “The
self-evident truths announced in the Declaration of Independence are not truths at all,
if taken literally.”342  New Hampshire Senator David Moril summarized his view in
opposing Pinkney’s:  “[W]hat does the gentleman say?  ‘That all men are created
equal’ is absurd, because one is born poor, another to inherit a fortune—one a peas-
ant, another a prince—one a slave, another a freeman.”343  And Pennsylvania Senator
Jonathan Roberts attributed to Pinkney the view “that the self-evident truths set forth
in the Declaration of Independence, are not, as we understand them, the foundation
of all our principles of law, but merely abstract aphorisms, which have but a limited
meaning.”344  This functionalist sentiment met with stiff opposition from anti-slavery
advocates—with Senator Moril rejoining, “I presume the equality intended does not
consist in the fortune [men] may enjoy, or the rank they may hold in society, but in
the inalienable right with which every one is indued”345—but the proslavery voices
persisted.  Indeed, Virginian Representative Andrew Smyth took the attack on the
aspirational Declaration a step further by arguing that the document actually militated
against any limitations on slavery:
[The Continental Congress] asserted that man cannot alienate his
liberty, nor by compact deprive his posterity of liberty.  Slaves are
not held as having alienated their liberty by compact.  They are
held under the law and usage of nations, from the remotest times
of which we have any historical knowledge, and by the municipal
laws of the States, over which the Congress of 1776 had not, and
340 Id. at 1182.
341 Detweiler, supra note 330, at 604.
342 35 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 336, at 405.
343 Id. at 296. It is perhaps interesting to note that James Wilson addressed this very ob-
jection at the time of the founding: “however great the variety and inequality of men may be
with regard to virtue, talents, taste, and acquirements; there is still one aspect in which all men
in society, previous to civil government, are equal. With regard to all, there is an equality in
rights and in obligations.” James Wilson, Of Man, As a Member of Society (1791), in 1 THE
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 227, 241 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967).
344 35 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 336, at 341.
345 Id. at 296.
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this Congress have not, any control.  We agree with the Congress
of 1776, that men, on entering into society, cannot alienate their
right to liberty and property, and that they cannot, by compact,
bind their posterity.  And, therefore, we contend that the people
of Missouri cannot alienate their rights, or bind their posterity by
a compact with Congress.346
Here, then, is an extreme version of the functionalist Declaration—one which re-
jects the aspirational reading entirely—accomplished in two parts:  first, the equality
language does not refer to slaves, who have been outside of society since time im-
memorial; and, second, natural law prevents one generation from imposing any
restrictions on the next’s right to hold property.  Read this way—and many proslavery
delegates were happy to accept the invitation—Jefferson’s preamble actually pro-
tected Missouri whites by ensuring them an equal “right to alter, to amend, [or] to
abolish their constitution[].”347
In the end the more modest functionalist Declaration won out, as evidenced in
the Missouri Compromise.  The arrangement admitted Missouri without a restriction
on slavery, brought in Maine as a free state, and prohibited the expansion of slavery
into the remaining portion of the Louisiana Purchase north of Missouri’s southern
border.348  As such, the Compromise reflected Northern aspirations for the gradual
elimination of slavery, but, as a political matter, conceded the functional need for a
delicate balance of slave and free states.  As then-Representative John Tyler explained
in cautioning against the too-literal application of natural law aspirations, “Liberty
and equality are captivating sounds; but they often captivate to destroy.”349  And, as
the St. Louis Enquirer sagely observed of life in Missouri after the Compromise:
Our declaration of rights tells us that “all men are born equal,”
that is, are entitled to equal rights. . . .  This truth entitles every
slave to his freedom, and that without delay—but will those who
have these words continually within [their] mouths be willing to
go so far?  No, necessity, policy, expediency, etc. forbid.350
The extreme functionalist account—which saw the Declaration protecting slave-
holder’s rights—lived on in proslavery thought, and eventually made a significant
346 Id. at 1005 (emphasis added).
347 36 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 336, at 1384. John Tyler (Va.), Louis McClane (De.),
and Richard Johnson (Ky.) were among those who pressed Smyth’s argument further. See
Detweiler, supra note 330, at 609–10.
348 GEORGE B. TINDALL & DAVID E. SHI, AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 408–11 (4th
ed. 1996).
349 36 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 336, at 1384.
350 Theory and Practice, ST. LOUIS ENQUIRER, Feb. 10, 1821, at III.
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reappearance in the Supreme Court.351  But over most of the next three decades some
version of the moderate functional interpretation held sway, as Congress engaged in
increasingly Ptolemaic gyrations to preserve the Union.  By no means, however, did
the aspirational reading disappear altogether.  Indeed, it remained alive and vibrant
in the rhetoric and politics of other social movements.
Over that time, a number of activist groups wrote their own, alternative versions
of the Declaration of Independence, many adapting Jefferson’s preamble expressly
to include their own communities.352  In 1829, George Henry Evans authored the first
such effort—The Working Men’s Declaration of Independence—on behalf of the New
York Working Man’s Party.353  Published in the Working Man’s Advocate, Evans’s
Declaration began, “‘When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary’ for
one class of a community to assert their natural and unalienable rights in opposition
to other classes of their fellow men,” and then proceeded to intersperse quotations
from Jefferson with his own, class-oriented language.354  A similar appeal to the aspi-
rational Declaration emerged five years later from an association of trade unions in
Boston.355  The Declaration of Rights of the Trades’ Union of Boston and Vicinity
announced that, “With the Fathers of our Country, we hold that all men are created
free and equal” and condemned all “laws which have a tendency to raise any peculiar
class above their fellow citizens.”356  In 1844, farm and homestead advocate Lewis
Masquerier drew up a Declaration of Independence of the Producing from the Non-
Producing Class, which held “these truths to be self-evident:  That as the natural
wants and powers of production of all men are nearly equal, all should be producers
as well as consumers.”357  And perhaps the best-known alternative Declaration came
351 William Jenkins has treated this argument as a version of a contextual equality claim,
whereby men were equal with others within their own “community”: white landholders with
other white landholders; white laborers with other white laborers; slaves with slaves; and so
on. He attributes this argument in later years to Jefferson Davis, Senator Albert Gallatin Brown
of Mississippi, and Senator (later General) Thomas Read Rootes Cobb of Georgia. WILLIAM
S. JENKINS, PRO-SLAVERY THOUGHT IN THE OLD SOUTH 191–94 (Peter Smith 1960) (1935).
A version of this extreme account of the Declaration would reappear in Dred Scott v. Sanford,
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). See infra notes 352–53 and accompanying text.
352 See WE, THE OTHER PEOPLE: ALTERNATIVE DECLARATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE BY LABOR
GROUPS, FARMERS, WOMAN’S RIGHTS ADVOCATES, SOCIALISTS, AND BLACKS, 1829–1975
(Philip S. Foner ed., 1976) [hereinafter WE, THE OTHER PEOPLE].
353 Id. at 47.
354 George H. Evans, The Working Men’s Declaration of Independence (1829), in THE
WORKING MAN’S ADVOCATE, Dec. 5, 1829 at 2, reprinted in WE, THE OTHER PEOPLE, supra
note 352, at 48.
355 WE, THE OTHER PEOPLE, supra note 352, at 51.
356 Boston Trades’ Union, Declaration of Rights of the Trades’ Union of Boston and
Vicinity (1834), in THE MAN, June 12, 1834, at 2, reprinted in WE, THE OTHER PEOPLE,
supra note 352, at 52.
357 Lewis Masquerier, Declaration of Independence of the Producing from the Non-
Producing Class (1844), in WORKING MAN’S ADVOCATE, Sept. 28, 1844, reprinted in WE, THE
OTHER PEOPLE, supra note 352, at 66; see WE, THE OTHER PEOPLE, supra note 352, at 64–65.
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out of the Woman’s Rights Convention in Seneca Falls, New York in July of 1848.358 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions galvanized the
emerging women’s movement with a list of grievances against patriarchy, and with
her famous addition to Jefferson’s original language:  “We hold these truths to be
self-evident:  that all men and women are created equal.”359
These adoptions and adaptations reveal just how alive the aspirational Declaration
remained in the American mind, but they also demonstrate that the prevailing func-
tional account left many marginalized groups feeling excluded from the ideal.  And
this exclusion remained most obvious and controversial in the case of black slaves. 
Indeed, by the 1850s the political tension over slavery had grown so extreme that even
the qualified Declaration could no longer serve much functional purpose.  In January
of 1854, Illinois Senator Stephen Douglas proposed a bill aimed at making Chicago the
eastern terminus of future railroad extension into the western territories.360  To carry his
bill—part of which organized the unsettled portions of the Louisiana Purchase into
the Kansas and Nebraska territories—Douglas needed the support of Southern congress-
men, and as a result he made a series of fateful concessions to slave interests.361  The
final version of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, as it came to be known, eviscerated the
Missouri Compromise by eliminating the prohibition on slavery in the Louisiana terri-
tories, and aroused such intense sectional animosity that it seemed to set the nation on
an inevitable road to civil war.362  And it was in this fractured and volatile political con-
text that Chief Justice Roger Taney set out to destroy the aspirational Declaration
of Independence once and for all with his opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford.363
Dred Scott, a slave owned by Dr. John Emerson and his family, sued for his free-
dom in Missouri state court based on his travels with Emerson to free soil in both
Illinois and the Wisconsin Territory.364  Scott won his freedom from a Missouri
jury, but lost it again on appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court.365  He then filed suit
in the federal circuit court in St. Louis, and ultimately took his appeal to the United
States Supreme Court.366  The threshold issue in federal court—whether Scott was
358 See WE, THE OTHER PEOPLE, supra note 352, at 77–78.
359 Elizabeth C. Stanton, Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions (1848), reprinted in
WE, THE OTHER PEOPLE, supra note 352, at 78 (emphasis added).
360 TINDALL & SHI, supra note 348, at 663–65.
361 Id.
362 Id. at 663–70. Sectional hostilities boiled over on the ground as “popular sovereignty”
gave way to violence in “Bleeding Kansas.” Likewise, mobs in Boston rioted against con-
tinued enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act, and violence even invaded the Senate when
South Carolinian Preston Brooks severely beat Massachusetts’ Charles Sumner as he sat at
his desk. Id.
363 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
364 Id. at 396–97.
365 Id. at 398.
366 Id. at 398–99. In the federal appeal, Emerson’s widow turned matters over to her
brother, John Sanford of New York. Id.
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a constitutional “citizen” for diversity jurisdiction purposes—put the scope of the
Declaration’s preamble squarely in question; and Taney answered in no uncertain
terms.367  He began by referencing a “fixed and universal” history that regarded blacks
as “beings of an inferior order” who were “altogether unfit to associate with the white
race, either in social or political relations.”368  In Taney’s reckoning, it was traditionally
thought that blacks were “so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man
was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to
slavery for his benefit.”369  He then explicitly reconciled this historical interpretation
with the Declaration of Independence in a passage that is worth quoting at length:
The general words above quoted [“all men are created equal”]
would seem to embrace the whole human family, and if they were
used in a similar instrument [today they] would be so under-
stood.  But it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African
race were not intended to be included, and formed no part of the
people who framed and adopted this declaration; for if the lan-
guage, as understood in that day, would embrace them, the con-
duct of the distinguished men who framed the Declaration of
Independence would have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent
with the principles they asserted. . . .  Yet the men who framed
this declaration were great men—high in literary acquirements—
high in their sense of honor, and incapable of asserting principles
inconsistent with those on which they were acting.  They perfectly
understood the meaning of the language they used, and how it
would be understood by others; and they knew that it would not
in any part of the civilized world be supposed to embrace the negro
race, which, by common consent, had been excluded from civilized
Governments and the family of nations, and doomed to slavery.370
Taney thus denied that the Declaration ever had any aspirational meaning at all, and
imputed this same understanding to the Constitutional Convention.  He easily con-
cluded, therefore, that Scott “was not a citizen of Missouri within the meaning of
the Constitution of the United States.”371
367 Id. at 403.
368 Id. at 407.
369 Id.
370 Id. at 410.
371 Id. at 427. It is certainly worth noting that dissenting Justices Benjamin Curtis and John
McLean did not buy Taney’s anti-aspirational account: “Our independence was a great epoch
in the history of freedom; and while I admit the Government was not made especially for the
colored race, yet many of them were citizens of the New England States, and exercised the
rights of suffrage when the Constitution was adopted, and it was not doubted by any
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This conclusion did not, as one might expect, draw a close to the opinion.  Rather,
Taney—perhaps under pressure from new President James Buchanan372—went on to
address the merits of Scott’s claim and, by extension, the federal government’s power
to restrict slavery in the territories.373  Taney creatively interpreted Congress’s Article IV
authority to “make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States”374 as extending only to those territories that
belonged to the United States at the time of ratification,375 and, finding no other power
over slavery in the text, concluded that Congress lacked legislative authority to restrict
the practice.376  This conclusion voided the Missouri Compromise’s prohibition on
slavery—already largely repealed by statute—as a matter of constitutional law, and
Taney (and Buchanan) hoped it would finally put an end to the intensifying calls for
federalized abolition.377  They could not have been more wrong, of course, as the
decision only provoked greater outrage and indignation among anti-slavery advo-
cates.378  In particular, Taney’s determined effort to bury the aspirational Declaration
of Independence drew inspired criticism from an up-and-coming senatorial candidate
in Illinois.379  Indeed, Abraham Lincoln would make the Declaration’s universal
promise one of the focal points of his campaign against incumbent Senator Stephen
Douglas.380
Speaking against the Dred Scott decision in Springfield, Illinois in the spring of
1857, Lincoln challenged Taney’s (and Douglas’s) contention that the Declaration
served no nobler purpose than to effect a formal separation from Britain—that, in
essence, it had no aspirational meaning.381  Lincoln saw the Preamble very differently,
and offered his own account of the Continental Congress’s intentions:
intelligent person that its tendencies would greatly ameliorate their condition.” Id. at 537
(McLean, J., dissenting).
372 Don Fehrenbacher and others have argued that President-elect Buchanan had a
number of communications with Justices John Catron and Robert Grier—and also Taney—
about the outcome of the pending case. DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS
SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 309–14 (1978); accord PAUL FINKELMAN,
DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 43–47 (1997). Relying on
these communications, Buchanan felt comfortable asserting in his inaugural speech that the
Supreme Court would soon issue a decision on the question of slavery in the territories. James
Buchanan, Inaugural Address (March 4, 1857), in 5 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 430, 431 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897).
373 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 431–33.
374 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
375 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 432.
376 Id. at 451–52.
377 See FINKELMAN, supra note 372, at 44–45.
378 See id. at 45.
379 See id. at 46–47.
380 See generally Harry v. Jaffa, Abraham Lincoln and the Universal Meaning of the
Declaration of Independence, in ORIGINS AND IMPACT, supra note 287, at 29–30 (reviewing
Lincoln’s take on the Declaration in his debates with Douglas).
381 Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 26, 1857), in 2 THE COLLECTED
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They did not mean to assert the obvious untruth, that all were then
actually enjoying that equality, nor yet, that they were about to
confer it immediately upon them.  In fact they had no power to
confer such a boon.  They meant simply to declare the right, so
that the enforcement of it might follow as fast as circumstances
should permit.  They meant to set up a standard maxim for free
society, which should be familiar to all, and revered by all; con-
stantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even though never
perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby con-
stantly spreading and deepening its influence, and augmenting
the happiness and value of life to all people of all colors every-
where.  The assertion that “all men are created equal” was of no
practical use in effecting our separation from Great Britain; and
it was placed in the Declaration, not for that, but for future use. 
Its authors meant it to be, thank God, it is now proving itself, a
stumbling block to those who in after times might seek to turn
a free people back into the hateful paths of despotism.382
He went on to ridicule Douglas’s recent public claim that the Declaration spoke only
of “British subjects on this continent being equal to British subjects born and resid-
ing in Great Britain.”383  Lincoln held up Douglas’s speech and invited the crowd to
“read that carefully over some leisure hour, and ponder well upon it—see what a
mere wreck—mangled ruin—it makes of our once glorious Declaration.”384  And from
these beginnings, the competing accounts of the Declaration would feature promi-
nently in the vigorous and storied campaign debates of the following year.
In nearly all of their seven debates, from Ottawa in August to Alton in October,
Douglas repeated the same charge—often in the same words—against Lincoln:  “[He]
reads from the Declaration of Independence that all men were created equal, and then
asks how can you deprive a negro of that equality which God and the Declaration
of Independence award to him?”385  To Douglas, Lincoln and “all the little Abolition
orators”386 were simply wrong, and the appropriate interpretation was barbarically clear:
For one, I am opposed to negro citizenship in any and every form. 
I believe this government was made on the white basis.  I believe
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 405–06 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
382 Id. at 406 (emphasis original).
383 Id.
384 Id.
385 Stephen Douglas, First Joint Debate, at Ottawa, Illinois (Aug. 21, 1858), in 3
COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 217 (John G. Nicolay & John Hay eds., 1894).
386 Id. at 216.
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it was made by white men, for the benefit of white men and their
posterity forever, and I am in favor of confining citizenship to white
men, men of European birth and descent, instead of conferring
it upon negroes, Indians, and other inferior races.387
Lincoln was, in truth, initially measured and politic in his responses.  In northern
Illinois, at places like Freeport and Ottawa, he felt comfortable saying “there is no
reason in the world why the negro is not entitled to all the natural rights enumerated
in the Declaration of Independence,”388 while in more southern cities like Jonesboro
and Charleston he conceded that “while [the races] remain together there must be
the position of superior and inferior, and I as much as any other man am in favor of
having the superior position assigned to the white race.”389  But, as the debates neared
their conclusion in Galesburg and Alton, Douglas’s attacks grew more intense, and
in response Lincoln began to return to the aspirational principles he had defended a
year earlier in Springfield.
At Galesburg on October 7, Douglas made his most impassioned case yet against
the aspirational Declaration:
I tell you that this Chicago doctrine of Lincoln’s—declaring that
the negro and the white man are made equal by the Declaration
of Independence and by Divine Providence—is a monstrous heresy. 
The signers of the Declaration of Independence never dreamed of
the negro when they were writing that document. . . .  Now, do
you believe—are you willing to have it said—that every man who
signed the Declaration of Independence declared the negro his
equal, and then was hypocrite enough to hold him as a slave, in
violation of what he believed to be the divine law?390
In response that day, Lincoln asserted that “the entire records of the world . . . may
be searched in vain for one single affirmation, from one single man, that the negro
was not included in the Declaration of Independence”;391 a claim he fleshed out in
more detail—and with more confidence and venom—the following week at Alton:
387 Id.
388 Abraham Lincoln, Mr. Lincoln’s Reply in the Ottawa Joint Debate (Aug. 21, 1858),
in 3 COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 385, at 229–30.
389 Abraham Lincoln, Fourth Joint Debate, at Charleston, Illinois (Sept. 18, 1858), in 4
COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 385, at 90.
390 Stephen Douglas, Fifth Joint Debate, at Galesburg, Illinois (Oct. 7, 1858), in 4 COMPLETE
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 385, at 254–55.
391 Abraham Lincoln, Mr. Lincoln’s Reply in the Galesburg Joint Debate (Oct. 7, 1858),
in 4 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 385, at 263.
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At Galesburg the other day, I said, in answer to Judge Douglas,
that three years ago there never had been a man, so far as I knew
or believed, in the whole world, who had said that the Declaration
of Independence did not include negroes in the term “all men.” 
I reassert it to-day.  I assert that Judge Douglas and all his friends
may search the whole records of the country, and it will be a
matter of great astonishment to me if they shall be able to find that
one human being three years ago had ever uttered the astound-
ing sentiment that the term “all men” in the Declaration did not
include the negro.  Do not let me be misunderstood.  I know that
more than three years ago there were men who, finding this asser-
tion constantly in the way of their schemes to bring about the
ascendancy and perpetuation of slavery, denied the truth of it. . . . 
But I say, with a perfect knowledge of all this hawking at the
Declaration without directly attacking it, that three years ago there
never had lived a man who had ventured to assail it in the sneaking
way of pretending to believe it and then asserting it did not in-
clude the negro.  I believe the first man who ever said it was Chief
Justice Taney in the Dred Scott case, and the next to him was our
friend, Stephen A. Douglas.  And now it has become the catchword
of the entire party.392
This, then, is the Lincoln that emerged from the debates with Stephen Douglas:  the
man whom, though unsuccessful in his Senate bid, would assume the Presidency just
two years later, as the nation teetered on the edge of civil war.  And this—the con-
solidation and universalization of the aspirational Declaration of Independence—
was among the core convictions of purpose that he carried with him into that office.
Without rehearsing the well-known vagaries of the early Civil War, it is sufficient
to say that, by the summer of 1863, Lincoln actively sought an opportunity to ground
the numbing human sacrifices of battle in a profound—indeed, a sacred393—statement
of constitutional purpose.  In September of 1862, after the Battle of Antietam, he issued
a preliminary proclamation threatening to free the slaves in those rebellious states
that did not desist by year’s end,394 and specific enforcement followed on January 1,
392 Abraham Lincoln, Mr. Lincoln’s Reply in the Alton Joint Debate (Oct. 15, 1858), in
5 COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 385, at 36–38.
393 For a fascinating account of the central role of sacrifice and the sacred in politics
and political communities, see PAUL W. KAHN, SACRED VIOLENCE: TORTURE, TERROR, AND
SOVEREIGNTY (2008); see also Ronald R. Garet, “The Last Full Measure of Devotion”:
Sacrifice and Textual Authority, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 277 (2006).
394 Abraham Lincoln, Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation (Sept. 22, 1862), in 5 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 381, at 434.
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1863.395  But these were essentially military and political documents, aimed at
swaying British sentiment in favor of the Union cause,396 and not the kind of ethical
statement required for the canonical reformation that Lincoln desired.  That summer,
however, the cataclysmic bloodletting at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania—culminating in
Confederate Major General George Pickett’s ill-fated charge up Cemetery Ridge—
would provide Lincoln thallowed ground the aspirational meaning of Jefferson’s
Declaration of Independence.
Left to clean up the grisly aftermath of three days of horrific battle,397 Pennsylvania
Governor Andrew Curtin charged Gettysburg banker David Wills with the task of
giving proper burial to the thousands of abandoned bodies.398  Wills formed an inter-
state fundraising commission, took bids on reburial costs, ordered caskets from the
War Department, and hired landscape architect William Saunders to design a National
Cemetery on seventeen acres of new public land.399  In September, he invited former
Harvard President, Senator, and Secretary of State Edward Everett to deliver an oration
in November dedicating the site; and two months later he asked President Lincoln also
to give “a few appropriate remarks” on the occasion.400  Lincoln took the invitation
very seriously, and, leaving his nearly hysterical wife in Washington with a sick child
(and one recently buried), he made his way into a crowded Gettysburg on November 18,
a day before the ceremony.401  That evening he offered some brief comments to a
small crowd gathered at his door:
I appear before you, fellow-citizens, merely to thank you for this
compliment.  The inference is a very fair one that you would hear
395 Abraham Lincoln, Emancipation Proclamation (Jan. 1, 1863), in 6 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 381, at  28–30.
396 See generally Christopher Ewan, The Emancipation Proclamation and British Public
Opinion, 67 THE HISTORIAN 1 (2005) (recounting shift in British public opinion based on the
slavery issue).
397 For a particularly vivid account of the aftermath, see GABOR BORITT, THE GETTYSBURG
GOSPEL: THE LINCOLN SPEECH THAT NOBODY KNOWS 1–23 (2006).
398 GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA 21
(1992) (quoting Letter from David Wills to Governor Curtin (July 24, 1863) (unpublished,
on file at the Pennsylvania State Archives)). Wills had earlier written to Curtin describing the
gruesome scene: “In many instances arms and legs and sometimes heads protrude [above
ground] and my attention has been directed to several places where the hogs were actually
rooting out the bodies and devouring them.” Id. Garry Wills estimates that 8,000 bodies were
left above or barely below ground; of these roughly 3,300 Confederate bodies were eventually
shipped south. Id. at 20 & n.4.
399 Id. at 21–22.
400 DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 460 (1995) (quoting Letter from David Wills
to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 2, 1863), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS AT THE LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS [hereinafter LINCOLN PAPERS], available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/alhtml/
alhome.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2009)).
401 WILLS, supra note 398, at 26.
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me for a little while at least, were I to commence to make a speech. 
I do not appear before you for the purpose of doing so, and for
several substantial reasons.  The most substantial of these is that
I have no speech to make.  [Laughter.]  In my position it is some-
what important that I should not say foolish things.  [A Voice: 
If you can help it!]  It very often happens that the only way to help
it is to say nothing at all.  [Laughter.]  Believing that is my present
condition this evening, I must beg of you to excuse me from
addressing you further.402
Lincoln—never fond of extemporaneous speaking in his capacity as President—was
profoundly conscious of the significance his words could have at that time and place,
and thus he wanted to spend time polishing his remarks for the next day.403
There is perhaps more myth and heroic narrative surrounding Lincoln’s prep-
aration of the Gettysburg Address than there is of any other canonical text.  Years
later Mary Shipman Andrews would make famous the story of a haggard President
scribbling with a broken pencil on a scrap of wrapping paper aboard the train to
Pennsylvania.404  Other accounts insist that he wrote it on the back of an envelope
at Wills’s house, or, better yet, composed it on the spot as he listened to Everett’s
oration.405  The truth is difficult to nail down, but various surviving drafts indicate
that he had at least written a version of the speech before leaving Washington,406 and
in all likelihood Lincoln constructed and polished the text as carefully and precisely
as was his usual custom.407  But, whatever the case, after Everett’s long and learned
oration, the President rose and, in his high-pitched Kentucky drawl, delivered the brief
address that, as George Anastaplo has said, “remains the most distinctive distillation
of Lincoln’s ‘political religion’”:408
Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth upon
this continent a new Nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated
to the proposition that all men are created equal. [Applause.] 
402 Abraham Lincoln, Remarks to Citizens of Gettysburg (Nov. 18, 1863), in 7 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 381, at 16–17.
403 WILLS, supra note 398, at 31.
404 MARY RAYMOND SHIPMAN ANDREWS, THE PERFECT TRIBUTE 5–7 (1906).
405 WILLS, supra note 398, at 27.
406 It seems that Lincoln penned a first draft on White House stationery, which suggests
he wrote it while still at home. Succeeding drafts show various degrees of revision and polish.
See LINCOLN, supra note 402, at 17 n.2. For a beautiful reproduction of the White House draft,
see WILLIAM E. BARTON, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG 72 (1930).
407 See DONALD, supra note 400, at 460–61.
408 GEORGE ANASTAPLO, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A CONSTITUTIONAL BIOGRAPHY 231 (1999)
(quoting Lincoln, supra note 402, at 17).
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Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that
Nation or any Nation so conceived and so dedicated can long en-
dure.  We are met on a great battle-field of that war.  We are met
to dedicate a portion of it as the final resting-place of those who
here gave their lives that that nation might live.  It is altogether
fitting and proper that we should do this.  But in a larger sense
we cannot dedicate, we cannot consecrate, we cannot hallow this
ground.  The brave men living and dead who struggled here have
consecrated it far above our power to add or detract.  [applause] 
The world will little note nor long remember what we say here,
but it can never forget what they did here. [applause]  It is for us,
the living, rather to be dedicated here to the [unfinished] work
that they have thus far so nobly carried on. [applause]  It is rather
for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us,
that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that
cause for which they here gave the last full measure of devotion;
that we here highly resolve that the dead shall not have died in
vain [applause]; that the nation shall, under God, have a new birth
of freedom; and that Governments of the people, by the people,
and for the people, shall not perish from the earth [Long-continued
applause.].409
In just his first two sentences, Lincoln codified and immortalized the aspirational
Declaration of Independence, and, perhaps more importantly, made it the ideological
stakes of the Civil War.  It was, after all, eighty-seven years after the signing of that
document—not the ratification of the Constitution—that he took the stage in Gettysburg
and recommitted us to Jefferson’s ideal; and it was this “Nation so conceived” that
was on trial by fire.
There is some debate about the address’s immediate reception,410 and it is evi-
dent that not every listener found it compelling.411  But Edward Everett, for one, told
Lincoln that his brief remarks had likely surpassed his own two-hour oration,412 and
409 Abraham Lincoln, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettysburg
(Nov. 19, 1863) Newspaper Version, in 7 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
supra note 402, at 19–21.
410 BARTON, supra note 381, at 89–92 (noting that the reported “applause was of such a
character that men like Colonel Carr could not feel sure that it had occurred”).
411 The Democratic press, in general, was outraged that Lincoln had looked to the
Declaration, rather than the Constitution, for guidance on the nation’s founding dedication,
see, e.g., DONALD, supra note 400, at 465. The Harrisburg Patriot and Union opted to “pass
over the silly remarks of the President; for the credit of the nation we are willing that the veil
of oblivion shall be dropped over them,” and the London Times opined “[a]nything more dull
and commonplace it wouldn’t be easy to produce.” BARTON, supra note 406, at 115–16.
412 See Letter from Edward Everett to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 20, 1863), in LINCOLN
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there is now no serious doubt that Lincoln was mistaken when he claimed “[t]he
world will little note nor long remember what we say here.”413  Indeed, contrary to
the President’s noble sentiment, one could credibly argue that more Americans today
are familiar with the Gettysburg Address than know of Pickett’s Charge, Little Round
Top, or the Peach Orchard.  As one historian has put it, “Many of us who know [the
Address by heart] could not tell where Gettysburg is nor when the battle was fought.”414 
This is because it is the speech, and not the battle, that symbolizes the canonical refor-
mation of the Declaration of Independence.  It is the Gettysburg Address as an ethical
metonym—fused in war with Jefferson’s Preamble—that recanonized the aspirational
Declaration and recommitted us to universal human equality.  This is not to say, of
course, that the aspiration was then, is now, or ever will be realized.  But it is to say
that it is the American aspiration; there is no longer any recourse to the functional
Declaration, and the aspirational metonym has set up very firmly indeed in the con-
stitutional riverbed.  And it is thanks to this process of canonical reformation—this
“new birth of freedom”—that we know exactly where the Supreme Court is pointing
us when it invokes “[t]he conception of political equality from the Declaration of
Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address.”415
CONCLUSION
I hope the preceding examples successfully illustrate three distinct kinds of
canonical evolution in constitutional argument—decanonization, canonical refine-
ment, and canonical reformation—which may roughly correspond to the familiar
doctrinal practices of repudiating, distinguishing, and extending common law precedent. 
I further hope that I have demonstrated that this evolution is internal to the forms of
argument themselves, as practiced within the existing spheres of constitutional dis-
course, and that is not the result of some external change in our empirical knowledge
of the texts or their creation.  Finally and most importantly, I hope that my descriptive
efforts offer practitioners some insight into the types of argument that can produce
changes in canonical and constitutional meaning over the long term.  And I would be
gratified if, along the way, I shed perhaps a little new light on—or at least refreshed
the memory of—old and familiar constitutional narratives.  With all that said, how-
ever, I want to devote my concluding paragraphs to reviewing the (perhaps esoteric)
theory underlying my efforts, and to discussing the implications and value of under-
standing canonical texts as argumentative metonyms.
One of Wittgenstein’s fundamental purposes in the Philosophical Investigations
was to reject the search for a single unified (or unitary) account of language’s internal
PAPERS, supra note 400. (“I should be glad, if I could flatter myself that I came as near to the
central idea of the occasion, in two hours, as you did in two minutes.”).
413 Lincoln, supra note 409, at 20.
414 Willard L. King, Lincoln at Gettysburg, 50 A.B.A. J. 1033 (1964).
415 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
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logic, which had occupied the bulk of his only other published work:  the Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus.416  Rather, the later Wittgenstein suggested that language is
not one activity, but a variety of different kinds of activities, each with different rules
and purposes.417  Across the spectrum of these myriad “language-games,” the same
word often serves a variety of different—though related—functions, each specific
to the particular “game” within which it is employed.418  From this it follows that a
word’s meaning often does not derive from some foundational referent in the world,
but rather is determined by the use to which it is properly put within a particular
language-game.419  The properly part is critical, for it precludes the impossible sug-
gestion that a word can mean whatever we want to use it to mean, and instead grounds
the generalized claim that “the meaning of a word is its use” in a more specific account
of what it is to understand and follow the rules of a language-game.420  Without
getting too deeply into Wittgenstein’s complex and controverted theory of how we
identify, understand, and follow these rules, it is essential to remember that obeying a
rule is also a social practice, and “[h]ence it is not possible to obey a rule ‘privately.’”421 
We can only know that we have successfully followed a rule—that we know how
to use a word and thus what it means—when our usage is understood, or “ratified,”
by another participant in the particular language-game.422  But, as elements of a prac-
tice, the rules themselves will evolve as contexts and purposes change, and as indi-
vidual participants leave their impact on the game.  It is in something like this way
that meanings change over time.423
Philip Bobbitt has thoughtfully applied some of these insights about the nature
of language to another contextualized social practice:  constitutional law.  He has
suggested that we should understand the Constitution itself as analogous to a
416 See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 12, at 11–12 (#23). Here Wittgenstein introduces
the concept of a varied “multiplicity of language-games” as an objection to “what logicians
have said about the structure of language. (Including the author of the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus.)” See also LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS 3–4
(D.F. Pears & B.F. McGuinness trans., Humanities Press 1974) (1921) (outlining the aim of
his “picture-theory” of language). For a very helpful introduction to these ideas, see A.C.
GRAYLING, WITTGENSTEIN: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 81–89 (2001); ROBERT J. FOGELIN,
WITTGENSTEIN 107–27 (2d ed. 1987).
417 WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 12, at 11–12, 13, 31 (#23, #27, #65).
418 Id. at 31–34 (#65–#71). Wittgenstein famously likened this “relation” to “family resem-
blances.” Id. at 32 (#67).
419 Id. at 20 (#43).
420 Id. at 20, 79–81 (#43, #195–#202); accord GRAYLING, supra note 416, at 86.
421 WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 12, at 81 (#202).
422 For a discussion of “ratification” in this context, see PETER WINCH, THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL
SCIENCE AND ITS RELATION TO PHILOSOPHY 36–39 (1958).
423 I concede that these last two sentences are probably an extrapolation of Wittgenstein’s
comments, though I think they are justified. For some related thoughts, see FOGELIN, supra
note 416, at 121–22; Bartrum, supra note 7, at 188–89.
392 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 18:327
Wittgensteinian language-game—complete with its own internal rules or grammar—
and that we must ground assertions of constitutional meaning (if they are to be legiti-
mate) in the proper forms of argument and usage.  I hope that this paper has offered
a useful account of how we interact with particular kinds of terms—canonical texts—
in building these arguments, and of how these terms’ meanings can change over time
as we engage in the practices of constitutional law.  This account builds on some of
Wittgenstein’s last thoughts about the nature of certainty, empiricism, and founda-
tionalism, and uses his analogy of the river and its bed to explore the relationship
between the constitutional canon and constitutional practice.  My contention is that,
while a competent constitutional practitioner must remain within the canonical river-
bed when constructing modal arguments, she may in turn—through perhaps subtle
alterations in usage—reshape the constitutional geology over time.  Importantly, this
is not to suggest (in some crude realist sense) that a canonical text means whatever
an advocate or judge uses it to mean at any particular place and time.  We still must
follow the rules, and our usages must be understood and ratified within the relevant
community, for us to make any legitimate assertion of constitutional meaning.424  The
claim is rather that, as creative individual actors within a much larger creative prac-
tice, we can impact and grow the rules of the language-game over time, thus changing
the ways that canonical texts are appropriately used and understood.
One might still wonder, at this point, why it is helpful to understand canonical
texts as metonyms for larger sets of associated concepts and principles.  I suggest
that thinking of the canon this way allows us to place these texts within the class
of argumentative terms that derive their meaning primarily from usage, when we
might otherwise see them as among the smaller group of terms whose meaning may
be fixed by “rigid designation,”425 or, perhaps more loosely, what Wittgenstein calls
“ostensive definition.”426  That is, without the concept of metonyms, it might seem
perfectly appropriate to understand canonical texts as the argumentative analog of
proper names; the reference is to a particular text in the world, and the meaning of the
text—once established—remains ever the same.  When, however, we understand that
the invocation of a canonical text does not point us to the text itself, but rather to a
larger set of associated principles, it becomes easy to see how the text’s argumentative
meaning derives from its correct use in discourse.  Further, it becomes plausible to
suggest that—as a metonym—a text’s meaning is more susceptible to those evolutions
in context, purpose, and application that alter our practices of rule following over
424 Neither do I intend to suggest, however, that we can derive an “ought” from an “is” by
looking to argumentative usage for guidance. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN
NATURE 302 (David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton eds., 2000). Again, my project is not a
normative one; I simply hope to describe what “is” in an effort to help account for evolutions
in legal meaning over time.
425 For an account of rigid designators—or terms that identify the same referent in all
possible worlds, see SAUL A. KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY 6–15 (1980).
426 WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 12, at 13 (#28).
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time.  One could credibly argue, I think, that Wittgenstein’s contention that a word
bears only a “family resemblance” to itself across a multiplicity of language-games
already renders many words somewhat metonymic in nature,427 and the relation of
word to meaning is made only more abstract when—on top of this—a practitioner
deliberately uses a term metonymically.  It is all of this play in the joints, I suggest,
that makes the meaning of canonical texts particularly amenable to subtle and creative
argumentation over time.428  And it is this possibility, this opening for individual im-
pact over time, which I hope makes the idea of argumentative metonyms attractive
to constitutional practitioners.
Henri Bergson famously, and perhaps enigmatically, claimed that “action on the
move creates its own route, creates to a very great extent the conditions under which
it is to be fulfilled, and thus baffles all calculation.”429  While I might not go quite so
far as Bergson, his thought does capture something essential about the nature of con-
stitutional argument in general, and canonical metonyms in particular.  Part of the
reason that normative interpretive theories fail—or are at least inadequate—is that there
is something like a quantum effect at work in constitutional practice:  the arguments
themselves often alter the meaning of their constitutive parts.  Certainly, a successful
argument can bring about a decision that seems to settle a particular question of dis-
puted meanings; but even this stability exists for only a discrete contextual moment
before questions of new application arise.  Moreover, and this is the critical point here,
creative new arguments then employ these “settled” terms and texts in subtle new
ways that slightly alter the rules of the game, and in the process change their mean-
ings again over time.  Indeed, even an argument in support of a particular normative
interpretive theory necessarily exerts some evolutionary influence on the very norms
to which it appeals.  This is the inevitable uncertainty captured in Wittgenstein’s river
of empiricism, and it is the ultimate reason that constitutional law remains less like a
science and more like an art—that is, something to be described, but not explained.
427 For an interesting description of “family resemblance” reference in terms of word
clusters (something quite analogous to metonyms), see Sean Wilson, The Fallacy of
Originalism: What Philosophy of Language and Law Says About ‘Original Meanings' 14–15
(May 17, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1405451 (last
visited Nov. 20, 2009)).
428 Again, I should make clear that one cannot simply create new canonical meanings out
of whole cloth. Rather the practice is something like poetry, wherein the poet must use words
in ways that are at least familiar enough that a reader can understand or ratify them. But, to
succeed, the poet must also push the boundaries of rule following. See Bartrum, supra note
7, at 188–89 (discussing a similar idea in the context of metaphors).
429 HENRI BERGSON, THE TWO SOURCES OF MORALITY AND RELIGION 255–56 (R. Ashley
Audra & Cloudesley Brereton trans., 1935).
